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Abstract 
 
After World War II the United States, faced with the new Soviet threat of Communism, 
instituted the foreign policy known as “containment” in order to mitigate the threat to Western 
European states of Soviet expansionism. After the fall of Communism in the USSR in 1991 that 
policy was deemed, at once, a success and an anachronism. The power vacuum that the 
subsequent abandonment of that policy created was most notable in the Islamic states that had 
served as proxies in the Cold War against Communism. Both the backdrop of containment as 
well as the withdrawal of that policy served to lay the foundation for the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world as a function of American hegemony after 1991. 
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If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could then 
better judge, what to do, and how to do it. 
- Abraham Lincoln1 
																																																								
1. Abraham Lincoln, speech delivered at the close of the Republican state convention, 
which named him the candidate for the United States Senate, Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1858. 
- The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Wildside Press, 2008, p. 184. 
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Introduction 
 
 The Truman Doctrine sought to contain the spread of Communism so that it could not 
“infect” the rest of the world with a political policy deemed antithetical to the economic policies 
of the secular West. Post-WWII liberal democracies in the West feared that Communism might 
take root and spread across the globe if left unchecked. This counter-productive policy, however, 
has negatively affected the possibility of a lasting, stable, regional balance of power in the 
Islamic world. The policy of containment had a counter-productive effect in that it helped to 
energize and politicize Islam regionally and produce resistance towards US interests in the 
Muslim world.  
This examination analyzes the volatile link between the policy of containment and the 
rising Islamic influence in the region and three major challenges posed by these links: inclusion, 
marginalization, and quarantine. One is the capacity of Islamic states to sustain a more vital and 
active part of Muslim society in a global world in order to encourage inclusion and political 
mobilization. Second, Muslims may be integrated in theory, but they are financially, politically, 
and economically marginalized by Western secularism. Worse, no reliable method exists to 
sustain the financial investments of a global economy in a climate of radical Islam. Third, the 
Islamic states have been quarantined in much the same way that the Communist threat was 
contained through the Truman Doctrine, although the religious zeal of Islam presents a social 
challenge to the policy of containment. The Truman Doctrine sought to contain Soviet regional 
influence, and was far more pervasive and less transparent than the current political climate and 
thus complicates the containment of radical Islam in a more politically “correct” world. The 
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mistaken attempts to further quarantine the emerging threat of Islamic fundamentalism rest on 
the misguided understanding that containment continues to be a viable strategy in a global 
economy. Charles A. Kupchan, Zachary Karabell, and Richard K. Hermann’s work all support 
this assertion in that each challenges in one way or another the conflation of Islamic 
fundamentalism with Communism and the notion that an American policy can effectively 
mitigate a regional dilemma half a world away by policymakers less competent about the threats 
posed by Islam than they were about Communism. 
 Given these challenges, both the spread of Communism and Islamic fundamentalism 
have posed threats to the national security of the United States. This thesis addresses the 
following questions in an attempt to allay those threats going forward: One, did the past policy of 
containment produce a desirable outcome for the US in the Middle East and the Islamic world? 
Two, if not, what can be done to mitigate the damage to the US prestige abroad as a function of 
its failure in the Muslim world? 
This thesis argues that the policy of containment, though a relative success in addressing 
the Soviet threat, led to an atmosphere of mistrust and antipathy toward the United States in the 
Islamic world during the Cold War. This strategy, which the US depended on to counter the 
threat of Communism, could not be adapted properly to contain the threat of political, and often 
radicalized, Islam. Not only did it fail to effectively restrict Islamic extremism to the periphery, 
but it has also funded the violence and hostilities of this movement in the post-Cold War period. 
This claim holds important implications for US efforts to fight global terror and will have an 
immense impact on the global economy. Because future foreign policy in the Middle East simply 
restates the previously well-documented containment strategy, the enemy now has a playbook 
based on historical US policy decisions. Further, radical Islamic extremists are far less 
3 
	
transparent in their goals, are far less likely to be deterred by half-measures, and are more 
difficult to track or contain. Finally, the non-governmental status of these groups, their use of 
asymmetrical warfare, and their strategic mobility all factor into this new global threat.  
The USSR, for instance, was a sovereign state actor that could be found on a map and 
contained by conventional force and with whom diplomacy was possible. The emergence of 
Islamic fundamentalism is recognized, on the other hand, as a non-state player, whose adherents 
do not always share mutual goals. Additionally, the Islamic insurgence shares a “grass roots” 
ideology, fueled by civilian populations who support their ideology, both spiritually and 
financially, as a matter of faith.  
The problematic role and limits of containment, then, raise other important questions and 
issues. For example, exactly how did the policy of containment of Communism serve to alienate 
the peoples of the Islamic world? If the two superpowers did indeed employ the Middle Eastern 
states as proxies in their ideological competition against the Soviet Union, then what were the 
consequences of that proxy war? How did the usurpation of these states’ sovereignty, or the 
occupation of their lands, breed contempt? Was the continued threat from outside forces seen by 
the Muslim world as an attack on Islam itself?  
This thesis addresses these additional questions by examining the factors of Islamic 
discontent in the Muslim world and of the employment, by al Qaeda and others, of iconic 
symbols to mobilize anti-Western feelings. The confluence of these factors, and the failure of 
Realism, promoted Islamic fundamentalism and global jihad against the US The American 
foreign policy of containment of the Soviet Union directly, albeit unintentionally, served the 
needs of Islamic fundamentalism, and it armed groups like al Qaeda with the tools to combat US 
efforts to spread economic liberalism and democracy in the service of US businesses abroad. 
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Literature Review 	
 Several prominent scholars have failed to interpret the contradictory and sometimes even 
counterproductive role of containment in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East. 
According to Bernard Lewis, Islamic tradition and liberal democracy are fundamentally 
incompatible, and the Muslim world at the beginning of the twenty-first century faces a near-
impossible choice between religious reductionism and modernization. “The future of the Middle 
East will depend on which of them prevails,” he recently told an audience at Princeton 
University.2 Reports on the state of political development in Muslim societies seem to confirm 
Lewis's grim prognosis for the future. They also underscore Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of 
Civilizations” argument, but I believe that analysis to be imprecise. We must consider cultural 
quantification. Karen Elliott House asserts that dialog, rather than confrontation, may be possible 
on both sides, “if for no other reason than to clarify opposing positions that are essentially 
irreconcilable.”3 This raises the issue of whether theology formed the only basis of this tectonic 
divide, and suggests that realism and liberalism can perhaps come together in global harmony. 
Traditional Muslim society cannot come to terms with the depredations of globalized culture, its 
adherents claim, and extremism arises from a desperate nostalgia for the golden years of Islam, 
which fail to recognize the value of Western liberal ideals and individualism. That presupposes, 																																																								
2. Bernard Lewis, “Lewis tells audience of difficult choices facing the Islamic world,” 
Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996) 52-63. 
 
3. Quoted in Freedom in the World 2001 - 2002: The Democracy Gap (New York: 
Freedom House, 2001), https://freedomhouse.org/.../freedom-world-2002/essay-freedom-world-
2002 -democracy-gap 
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however, that the Islamic world has found any value in democracy, when in fact it has not been 
the boon to the Muslim world that it represents to the West. 
 On 18 December 2001, the New York-based Freedom House released a major study titled 
The Islamic World's Democracy Deficit. This report documented an expanding gap between 
Muslim countries and the rest of the world in terms of levels of freedom and democracy, and it 
noted that a non-Muslim country was three times more likely than a Muslim state to be 
democratic. This divide between democracy and freedom exists not only between Islamic 
countries and the West, but between them and other countries. Adrian Karatnychy, Freedom 
House president and coordinator of the report, observes that “there is a growing chasm between 
the Islamic community and the rest of the world. While most Western and non-Western countries 
are moving towards greater levels of freedom, the Islamic world is lagging behind.”4 This is, 
clearly, a symptom of the theological basis of Islam in general, but it also speaks to the divide 
between the West and the Muslim world, particularly in the Arab states. 
Several months later, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) confirmed the 
Freedom House findings in a widely circulated study entitled Arab Human Development Report 
2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations. This report, prepared by a team of Arab 
scholars, concluded that the Arab world faces a crossroads, and that three key deficits hamper the 
region. These defining features include: the freedom deficit; the women's empowerment deficit; 
and the human capabilities/knowledge deficit relative to income. Compared with the rest of the 
world, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom score in the 1990s, and, when measured by 
indicators such as political process, civil liberties, political rights and a free media, “the Arab 																																																								
4. These quotations are taken from the press release of the report, Freedom in the World 
2001 - 2002: The Democracy Gap, New York: Freedom House, 2001, 
https://freedomhouse.org/.../freedom-world-2002/essay-freedom-world-2002 -democracy-gap 
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region ... [had] the lowest value of all regions of the world for voice and accountability.”5 All of 
these variables suggest that fundamentalism arose from the discontent of the people and offered 
an important source of resistance to the Islamic and Arab states that had colluded with the West. 
However, I argue that the Islamic fundamentalist movements can also be explained by their 
resistance to the policy of containment.  
As early as 1965, scholars and researchers had questioned both the efficacy and the 
morality of containment. Indeed, D. F. Fleming posed this question in an article published in the 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, in which he debates the 
irreconcilable differences of perspective regarding the US’s ebbing prestige and goodwill 
resulting from the policy of containment of Communism. “It was the proclamation of the 
universal doctrine of containment, so foreign to our entire national history until 1946, and its 
prosecution, first against the Soviet Union and then against China,” declares Fleming, “which 
became the great immorality of the post-war world.”6 Within that context, this thesis brings to 
bear what psychologist John O. Beahrs describes as the paradoxical effects in political systems 
generated by policies such as the Truman Doctrine. Here these two scholars’ ideas meet as one.  
When Beahrs, for instance, states that “paradoxical effects often complicate public 
policy, contrary to expectation or intent,” he speaks unwittingly to the very heart of my own 
research. Beahrs argues that we can only cope with the effects of uncertainty, but that in doing so 
we must mitigate the paradoxes of policy and refocus them in a timely manner. Such was not the 
																																																								
5. United Nations Development Program, “Arab Development Report 2002: Creating 
Opportunities for Future Generations,” New York: 2002, 27. 
 
6. D. F. Fleming, “Is Containment Moral?” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
Science 362, (1965): 18-27. 
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case with the Truman Doctrine’s mission of containment of Communism, which was steadfastly 
guarded for decades after its practicality waned.  
 In a recent interview with Lieutenant William G. “Jerry” Boykin, Joel Rosenberg— who 
has researched radical Islam—quotes the now-retired commander of the Delta Forces as saying:  
When I came into the Army in 1971, we were focused on the Soviet Union. Even 
though we were fighting in Vietnam, our real threat was the Soviet Union. But 
[…] the threat that Radical Islam presents to not only America but to the world 
today is an even more serious threat than when we were in a nuclear standoff 
during the Cold War. And it’s more concerning to me because this is an enemy 
that is hard to understand. It is an enemy that is easy to ignore, and it is an enemy 
that is absolutely relentless.  
In that light, I offer a series of opinions and research from experts in the field and scholars, both 
American and Middle Eastern, who will illuminate how the United States policy of containment 
ushered in a more serious threat than the one that it had originally been tasked with eradicating: 
Communism. I will show that, because of the short-sightedness of that policy, the path of 
containment ignored the far-sighted threat of Islamic extremism. 
 These authors and scholars fail to adequately address the implications of the relationship 
between the Truman Doctrine and its unintended consequences regarding Islamic 
fundamentalism and extremism. This thesis combines Beahrs work in public policy and his 
“paradoxical effects” model with Lewis’s incompatibility theory. This intersection of disciplines 
rests on work done by scholars such as Rosenberg, Huntington, Fukuyama, and others, and 
considers the possibility that Fleming was correct: containment was immoral and insufficient. 
However, if containment was immoral, and we hold the rest of the variables constant, then the 
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Truman Doctrine (while it may have effectively brought down Communism) led to the rise of the 
Islamic extremism. 
 Three scholarly articles, in particular, explore these questions to one degree or another. 
Kupchan analyzes the basic misunderstanding of regional developments in the Middle East by 
US policy makers because of the soviet-centric nature of American foreign policy and the 
conceptual framework within which those policy-makers work. Karabell further considers the 
division between policy-makers who view Islamic fundamentalism as either the “new 
Communism,” or the vanguard of a coming civilization clash between the West and the Muslim 
world. Finally, Herrmann analyzes the post-Cold War strategies of the US in defense of US 
interests and the inefficacy of coercion as a force for positive change in the Middle East. All 
three argue individually that in contributing to the rise of Islam, containment is not only limited 
but must be radically reformulated to address the new nature of the current threats to which it 
helped give rise.  
These authors’ works overlap in ways that this analysis presents in a more coherent 
response to the challenges faced by the US in the Muslim world. Containment was a blunt force 
instrument that has done little to contain the rise of Islamic extremism while reinforcing the 
notion of the West as a threat to Islam in the Muslim world at large. Reliance on that policy will 
inevitably lead to greater frustration of the defense of US interests in the region and only further 
inflame anti-western tensions throughout the Muslim world. 	  
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Theoretical Framework 	
 The theories supporting this thesis come from International Relations’ models of state 
interaction, mainly Realism. On the one hand the United States and the Soviet Union were, 
following World War II, engaged in a realism-based relationship that was centered on the idea 
that state actors sought power and dominion over their neighbors. In a Hobbesian world of “all 
against all” it was clear to both nations that the ideologies of democracy and liberal capitalism, 
versus command economies and bureaucratic socialism, were antithetical to one another. Thus, 
the concept of containment was not only declared to be a moral one (the West was, after all, 
defending liberty and natural law) but also a sound response to an external threat via realism. 
The idea of containing that threat to a distant region of the globe was based on the perception 
that if Communism were allowed to spread unchecked, then the democratic-based nations of the 
world would topple like dominoes, one after the other. Adherence to realism was the only viable 
defense; it was reasoned at the time, for the US and the West against an ideological foe that 
decried liberty and the basis of capitalism which powered the growth of the US and its allies. 
Communism would be contained and relegated to the several countries in which it had taken root 
and the effect of its ideology mitigated through deterrence and military superiority at the expense 
of some of those Islamic proxies in the Middle East. 
 When the Soviet Union collapsed on Christmas day in 1991, the US policy-makers 
celebrated not knowing at what cost the United States had secured the destruction of the “Red 
Menace.” Though the crushing weight of Communism was eased significantly on that day, the 
full burden of the cost to the US would soon become apparent. The realism-based foreign policy 
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of the West had used the states in the Middle East as proxies in a Cold War against the USSR 
while the Western powers plundered those countries’ oil wealth in order to feed its own 
voracious appetite and hegemonic plans. Those whom the colonization of the Middle East by 
Europe did not alienate, the pillaging of their one truly great resource - oil reserves, did. 
Combined with the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the creation of 
Israel, the deep-seated Arab feelings of shame, humiliation, failure, and impotence in the modern 
world are, at its core, the result of being used as pawns by the United States, the former Soviet 
Union, and the European colonizers. That this was merely their perception is unimportant 
because perception is everything if there exist honest grievances. 
As a result, the US is moving again toward realism in its approach to dealing with the 
emerging Muslim powers there and states like Iran are in a full blown realist mode of their own. 
“Today, the time for the fall of the satanic power of the United States has come,” said Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in 1999, marking the anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, “and the 
countdown to the annihilation of the emperor of power and wealth has started.”7 There is no 
doubt that the theoretical basis of the conflicts between the United States and the Muslim states 
of the Middle East have been rooted in realism and an approach that is informed by such factors 
as the Carter and Bush Doctrines, which advocate protective defense or preemptive strikes on an 
enemy in order to thwart the ill intentions of a state before they can even become operational. 
This is leading toward neorealist resurgence. Elements of Communism, capitalism, theology, and 
liberal economics are factors but those ideologies are built on the foundation of realism that 
																																																								
7. “Ahmadinejad Says Israel Will Soon Disappear,” Agence France-Press, June 2, 2008. 
Quoted in Joel C Rosenberg, Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson & 
Jesus are Battling to Dominate the Middle East and Transform the World, (Carol Stream: 
Tyndale, 2009), 28.  
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divides states and their liberal counterpoints that act as the global glue of the future. The 
foundation of this thesis is that dichotomy between realism and liberal economics and the 
implications of those theories for the future of US foreign policy. By contrast, a more coherent 
response is based in constructivist systems that forge global alliances even as we recognize our 
diversities and respect our differences of culture and ideology.  
 Theological debates must be tempered. Cultural outlooks must be more inclusive. 
Respect for ethnicity must be reapportioned with respect to the more global nature of what 
Thomas Friedman calls a flat world: one that is growing closer from end to end by the hour. A 
more socially constructive policy orientation will address issues of identity, norms, and regional 
politics in a way that better compensates for the problematic relationship between containment of 
Communism and Islam. Constructivism transcends the theoretical limits of realism and 
containment which will give rise to a more efficacious foreign policy in the Middle East with 
regard to Islamic identity and US interests in the region. However, my research focuses mainly 
on the critique of Realism and its fundamental inadequacy in a globally connected world.  
Globalization stresses a collapse of national borders and a growing transnational 
interdependence. Since the theoretical origins of my argument are based in Constructivism, they 
acknowledge culture as a vibrant force in a global world. Realism details the concept of states as 
“rational” actors in a Hobbesian world of survival of the fittest. On the other hand, the key 
argument on the theoretical and policy implications of contemporary American hegemony is that 
the development of US hegemony generally, as well as the distinctive turn in US foreign policy 
in the wake of 9/11, can best be understood by placing events in a comparative and historical 
framework. The immediate post-World War II order laid the foundations of a highly-
institutionalized multilateral system that provided benefits for a number of countries.  
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The key argument on the theoretical and policy implications of contemporary American 
foreign policy is that the development of US hegemony generally, and the distinctive turn in US 
foreign policy in the wake of 9/11, can best be understood by placing events in a comparative 
and historical framework. The immediate post-World War II order laid the foundations of 
highly-institutionalized multilateral systems that provided benefits for a number of countries, 
while enhancing US power at the expense of the post-World War II theatre. The limits of realism 
and institutionalism are clear, realism is rooted in the past, and institutionalism in rooted in the 
future. The international system is no longer anarchic because of the foreign entanglements that 
George Washington, the first president of these United States, warned against. However, more 
saliently, a constructivist model that engages culture as legal tender also embraces the concept of 
liberal democracy and the protection of property, both personal and private, and that is the very 
foundation of liberty and justice.  
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Structure 
 
 Chapter One of this thesis will consider the political implications of the colonial period 
between World Wars I and II with regard to the political decisions made concurrently. What 
were the political decisions that both affected and were influenced by those events? What were 
the political ramifications of the decisions made by contemporary world leaders? There is a clear 
cut cause and effect in relations between states that informs this debate with regard to the 
unintended consequences of political decisions of that period. 
 Chapter Two discusses the implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the policy of 
containment of Communism. Here I ask why that policy was not adjusted to respond more 
quickly to the emerging threat of Islamic fundamentalism. In addressing this question, I shall 
address the history, political science and the shifting nature of ideologies and analyze how they 
affected United States foreign policy. 
 Chapter Three analyzes the rise of radical Islam following the fall of Communism and the 
implications of the emerging Islamic threat that ensued. This is also the period in which the 
United States’ foreign policy-makers should have reconsidered the blunt force instrument of 
containment as an effective policy instrument and retooled the American response to the 
challenges in the Middle East in a more constructive manner. 
 Finally, in Chapter Four, I examine the period after September 11, 2001 and the 
ramifications for foreign policy considerations regarding the Middle East and the Muslim world 
at large. Moreover, I consider the notion that Realism could be reworked to serve as a more 
positive for state interaction.  
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Chapter One:  
The Rise of the Superpower Rivalry 	
 In Chapter One, I examine three important aspects of my thesis. First, I document the 
emergence of the policy of containment of Communism (the Truman Doctrine). I do so by 
carefully noting the historical events that occurred after World War I and which influenced the 
global consideration of the Middle East in such as way as to make necessary the political need 
for US isolation of the ideologies of socialism and Islam. I then discuss the events after World 
War II and the beginning of the shift from the containment of Communism, to the support of 
puppet/proxy states in the Middle East in defense of oil deposits in the region. Containment of 
Communism is a foreign policy initiative that was never geared toward the emergent Islamic 
extremist agenda.  
 This chapter considers the morality of containment, and how the events between World 
Wars I and II speak to the unintended consequences of a policy that was based on historical 
considerations that tied the hands of each successive US administration. Prior to the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, the American foreign policy of containment was the driving force in 
seeking to halt the spread of the socialist agenda throughout the world. However, the Truman 
Doctrine that advocated containment also served to lay the early groundwork for Middle Eastern 
antagonisms toward the United States and the West in general as a result of its perceived 
usurpation of Muslim sovereignty. Islamic fundamentalism was shaped by US foreign policy 
through containment and the effect of that policy on the states that served American interests in 
the Middle East (interests such as oil). It encouraged the Islamic world to treat the West as the 
15 
	
“other” or heathen, and eventually ignited a global jihad to resist the occupation of US forces in 
the Arab lands In this way, the success of Containment fueled resistance; it helped to further 
politicize Islam or turn global jihad into a powerful military movement equipped with the very 
tools necessary to destroy the West including the use of propaganda and state control of the 
means of information distribution as well as the creation of a social counterintelligence apparatus 
that divided the polity through sectarian strife. 
George Kennan provided the rationale for containment during the early years of the Cold 
War, when the Korean War was still in play. Containment was needed to hold Soviet 
belligerency in check. The new US strategy, in this sense, would contain the spread of Soviet 
influence regionally, rather than confronting and inciting its spread. As Kennan puts it: “Never 
were American relations with Russia at lower ebb than in the first 16 years after the Bolshevik 
seizure of power in 1917. Americans were deeply shocked by the violence of the revolution, by 
the fanaticism and cruelty of the new rulers, by their refusal to recognize the debts and claims 
arising out of the recent war, and above all by the brazen world-revolutionary propaganda they 
put out and the efforts they mounted to promote Communist seizures of power in other 
countries.”8 Kennan’s intent was to inform not to incite. The same feelings of shock were 
expressed recently in the United States by the media throughout the recent Arab Spring 
uprisings. Ideological divides created an atmosphere in which everyone agreed that something 
must be done in Egypt, Yemen, and Syria recently with no one agreeing on exactly what remedy 
to employ.  
																																																								
8. George F. Kennan, After the Cold War, (New York: New York Times Co., 1989), 
pages 1 - 5. Reprinted by permission of the New York Times and the Harriet Wasserman 
Literary Agency, Inc. as agents for the author. 
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The consensus in political circles was that the best way to defend against Communism 
was to contain that threat to those places that had already been affected and, if possible, to roll 
back the tide of a Socialist/Communist agenda where possible. The effect of Kennan’s initial 
exhortations was to influence President Harry Truman’s decision to adopt the containment 
strategy as the official American reaction to the spread of Communism during the Korean War. 
That decision created a policy monolith that, regardless of the fact that Kennan largely would 
come to re-examine in his own analysis, would underscore the very basic failure of US foreign 
policy in the Muslim world for decades. “Kennan’s ideas, which became the basis of the Truman 
administration’s foreign policy, first came to public attention in 1947 in the form of an 
anonymous contribution, the so-called “X-Article,” to the journal Foreign Affairs.” The main 
element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union,” Kennan wrote, “must be that of a 
long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”9 Recent 
calls for “boots on the ground” and “no-fly zones” throughout the Middle East to combat ISIS in 
the region eerily recall those remarks by Kennan nearly sixty years ago. 
At the time, containment seemed to serve the best interests of the US government. While 
avoiding an overt act of war, containment sought to maintain the balance of power between the 
United States and the Soviet Union while simultaneously sustaining a level of military readiness 
that could serve as long as necessary to deter Soviet aggression. “It is evident, however, that both 
Truman and his successors elaborated the containment strategy far beyond Kennan’s 
intentions.”10 American foreign policy became Soviet-centric and any other foreign policy issue 
																																																								
9. George F. Kennan, “Milestones: 1945-1952,” US Department of State, Office of the 
Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan  
10. Ohaegbulam, 30. Based on Kennan’s “Containment Then and Now,” in Foreign 
Affairs 65, no. 4 (Spring 1987), 885-890. 
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was subordinated to the orientation of containment of the Soviet threat, even in situations that 
merited less offensive efforts. Although Truman’s successors modified this strategy in 
accordance with specific challenges, it was, with rare consistency, adhered to and adopted as an 
overarching policy. It was, for lack of a better term, the holy grail of American foreign policy in 
the twentieth century. The irony of something important, rarely adhered to, is simply a function 
of the ongoing understanding of political machinations that have been ongoing since Alexander 
the Great conquered an empire. My Constructivist argument even allows for this dichotomy of 
perspectives because it acknowledges various historical and cultural perspectives. Realism 
allows for one perspective: realpolitik. Institutionalism is more flexible, but is still constraining 
in the post-industrial world. Constructivism, I argue, should be the new foreign policy platform 
of the United States because it represents a new venue: the New Frontier. Constructivism, then, 
underscores the multiplicity of variable data while acknowledging diversity. 
The Truman Doctrine of containment, however, only targeted the spread of Soviet 
influence. In some cases, though, it required aiding Muslim insurgencies against this spread (i.e., 
Afghanistan), which would, in time, leave US influence as the object of this insurgency, or 
struggle for national liberation. The inability of US foreign policy-makers to address this issue 
constituted one of the primary limits of both containment and the Truman Doctrine. In short, 
containment may have been successful in targeting the Soviets; however, the emerging political 
and global agenda of Islamic extremism remained far less transparent and difficult to contain 
regionally. The main reason for that is that Islamic fundamentalism is based on the very stubborn 
foundation of religious beliefs that define the daily lives of Muslims in the Middle East in the 
most basic level and “fundamental” way. 
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  Thus, in a shifting political landscape toward globalization, there should also have been a 
shift in the policy of the United States with regard to containment. Yet containment became the 
permanent template for states that sought to bandwagon with the US politically through a rigid 
doctrine of halting the spread of Communism (as an antagonist to liberal economics with no 
regard to the cultural diversity of the Middle East. The US policy of containment was, therefore, 
a policy that the US extracted from its allies, at times to the detriment of their own cultural and 
political determination, which was contrary to what democracy was intended to foster. The 
consequences of institutionalizing politically measures to contain Communism were most 
profound in the Middle East from a political as well as a moral standpoint. Specifically, the US 
has a history of supporting brutal Arab dictators who had no interest in furthering the aspirations 
of their subjects but rather the avarice for political and economic gain. 
Fleming has questioned the morality of containment, and pointed out that the absolutist 
doctrine of containment failed to win the hearts and minds of nonaligned states. Moreover, it was 
condemned by our allies for its rigidity.11 The fact is that containment ceased to be a productive 
policy because the economic principles of the Soviet Union were already undermining its own 
strength as early as the mid 1960s or before. For example, Nikita Khrushchev expanded the 
collectivization of agriculture when he promoted the Virgin Lands campaign, saying the Soviet 
Union could meet and surpass Western agricultural production through the application of modern 
techniques and the use of new crops. However, initial successes rapidly turned sour. The Virgin 
Lands program was a fiasco, which involved the forcible removal of nearly half a million 
"volunteers" to Kazakhstan and resulted in the destruction of arable land. Corruption and the lack 
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of political transparency limited the Soviets’ ability to challenge the West economically or 
politically. The policy of containment, frankly, was inculcated in the Middle East to thwart the 
spread of Communism by containing that ideology economically. However, a willing, whose 
support was vital with the tacit several administrations, sign the checks and refuse the balances, 
was the line in the sand that is irrefutable. Each successive American administration built on the 
containment policy of its predecessor, ignoring the Soviet’s economic failures and focusing only 
on military capability and the perceived inability of the Arab states to govern or protect 
themselves from a Soviet attack. Another irony is that the policy of containment was, indeed, 
supposed to limit the spread that ideology but only propagated it in another form. Overseas aid in 
a post global war can certainly be understood as an imperial overreach after two millennia of 
intrusion and outside oversight. 
The demands of the containment strategy did little for the long-term growth of the 
American economy or our national security.”12 The Truman Doctrine was a tacit strategy 
employed to safeguard US interests that were represented by the guardianship of oil reserves in 
the Arab world but were done so by honest brokers of American security in an age that is 
undefined by the limitless scope of the new global dimension. Concurrently, the European grip 																																																								
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come to describe as an evil empire. 
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on the Middle East began to slip. Libya, the Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco became independent 
in 1956. Mauritania in 1960, Kuwait in 1961, Algeria in 1962, and the Gulf States achieving 
independence in 1971.13 Still, by the time that John F. Kennedy took office in 1960 the only 
immediate threat seemed to come from the Soviet Union. 
 In 1989 John Mueller, in an article entitled Enough Rope, argued that the United States 
did not so much win the Cold War as much as the Soviet Union lost it. While this rhetorical 
flourish may seem, at first glance, to be rather academic, it is in keeping with my argument, 
inasmuch as Mueller suggests that lapses in the Soviet Union’s bureaucratic and economic 
systems, as well as the increased cost to the Soviets to maintain their international standing 
militarily, undermined Communism from within.14 The same year Paul H. Kreisberg wrote, in 
Containment’s Last Gasp, that “a coherent and continuous front against the United States and the 
non Communist countries of Asia probably never existed.”15 While there was a very real threat to 
US interests from the Soviet Union in the 1940s “by the mid- 1950s this had lost virtually all its 
steam.”16 Containment was, therefore, more of a prophylactic than a positive prescription for 
global harmony and was a reactive rather than a proactive foreign policy. 
What Mueller and Kreisberg assert is that as early as the mid-1970s the Soviet Union had 
only a haphazard approach to bureaucracy, economics and military emphasis that, more often 
than not, defied any cogent plan to project strength beyond even its own borders. Thus, 
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according to Steinbruner’s and Mueller’s assessment, both a policy shift away from containment 
and a more coherent response to the outdated threat of containment was inherent in a more 
constructive foreign policy. The continuation of the of containment between 1970 and 1990 was 
more injurious to US interests in that it was during that time period that the United States wasted 
valuable political capital and time on a failed policy. As early as the Carter administration, 
containment was already sowing the seeds of strong anti-American and anti-Western feelings 
throughout the Muslim world. Hermann, in his rethinking of US political strategy, asks how the 
US could not only secure and “protect its influence by force and coercion, as Moscow did for 
years in Eastern Europe, but . . . build positive relationships with Middle Eastern countries that 
will survive internal change and growing demands for public empowerment.”17 Kupchan 
reinforces that sentiment when he questions why “US strategies fell prey to two key 
shortcomings . . . [that] the United States exaggerated the Soviet threat and [that the US] became 
preoccupied with it to the exclusion of regional problems. The United States jeopardized its own 
objectives by alienating regional states and intensifying the cold war [sic] in the Middle East.”18 
Hermann and Kupchan argue, independently, aspects that converge in this analysis, specifically 
that threatening information and images increase support for a realist-based foreign policy while 
reassuring information supports a more liberal policy based on respect for cultural differences.  
  As the civil unrest of the Eastern Europeans in Soviet bloc states began to pressure the 
leaders of the USSR to unleash their grip on those buffer nations between the Soviet Union and 
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Western Europe Richard Herman notes that “in the early 1990s, Steinbruner was among those 
advocating a shift in the balance of US security policy, moving from containment and deterrence 
to reassurance, and from active confrontation to cooperative engagement. Hermann identified 
cooperative engagement as a key strategic principle that sought to accomplish its purpose 
through institutional consent rather than the threat of material or physical coercion.”19 Those 
exhortations of constructive engagement came too late to stem the rise of the recently embraced 
forms of radical Islamic fundamentalism that were growing in the Middle East. A month before 
Michael McGwire’s publication of The Paradigm That Lost its Way (in which McGwire wrote of 
the failure of the policy of containment), the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade 
center in New York made clear that there were very real animosities toward the US in the 
Muslim world.. McGwire concludes that the policy of containment was an unworkable premise 
in a global age and that the Truman Doctrine, since it only served to create the very animosity 
that was brewing in the Middle East against the West.20 Kupchan’s research supports McGwire’s 
and, additionally, Kupchan notes that the “United States accurately perceives the nature of 
political change, but is unable to respond appropriately. The input itself is correct; it is the 
decision-making process that skews the output.”21 The policy formulation process of US political 
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elites regarding the Middle East has been hampered by the linear thinking of successive 
administrations’ embrace of containment as an effective policy tool.  
The Cold War was a “competition in economic bankruptcy”22 which first destroyed the 
poorer Soviets and then weakened the ability of the Soviet Union to compete economically. Yet 
“for about forty-five years the demands of the containment strategy - military preparedness and 
the perceived geopolitical need for allies - channeled research, development, and some of the 
most capable minds of the US into activities that did little for the long-term growth of the 
American economy” and exacerbated the antagonisms of the Muslim populations in the Middle 
East resulting, F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam asserts, in a “brain drain” that lured scholars to work on 
behalf of US policies to thwart Communism despite the actual weakness of the ideology. 23 
 Within months of the publication of Kennan’s article, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 
Walter Lippmann penned a series of columns for the New York Herald Tribune criticizing the 
article and, by implication, the containment policy. As Lipmann states “‘containment’ would 
commit the United States indefinitely to military holding actions around the Soviet periphery. 
Such a policy, he feared, would mean surrendering the strategic initiative to the Soviet Union 
and lead to the “misuse of American power.”24 Lippmann's critique, given the current challenges 
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in the Middle East, highlights the lack of diplomatic flexibility of containment because it 
eschews diplomacy. The same critiques are now being repeated in the media today with regard to 
the war in Iraq and, more recently, in response to the events surrounding the Arab Spring. Those 
voices underscore the necessity of a more constructive policy in the Muslim world rather than a 
long term commitment such as the fourteen years that the US has had a major military presence 
in Afghanistan for example. Lippmann's columns constituted the first important critique of the 
containment policy. As he had predicted, the US was committed to military and political actions 
around the Soviet periphery that were economically unfeasible and politically tenuous at best. 
More importantly to this analysis, those actions undermined US standing in the Muslim world. 
 The consequences of the pursuit of the outdated policy of containment were more clearly 
manifested in both Eastern and Western Asia, including the Middle East. Former correspondent 
for The Nation, Steven Hubbell, asserted in 1998 that “Soviet expansionism was cited as the 
rationale behind the 1957 Eisenhower doctrine (which authorized backing for conservative rulers 
such as King Hussein of Jordan and Camille Chamoun of Lebanon, who were besieged by 
domestic opponents), and for adventures as varied as the overthrow of the Mossadegh 
government in Iran in 1953, support for Israel in the 1967 and 1973 wars, and the arming of U. 
S. proxies in the Gulf,”25 in an article entitled Containment Myth: US Middle East Policy in 
Theory and Practice. “It hardly mattered that containment was singularly ill-suited to the 
specificities of the region. What did matter was Americans’ willingness to accept it as a 
sufficient justification for their government’s machinations” despite its efficacy or lack thereof.26 
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The Arab states proved to be nearly impervious to Moscow’s ideological appeal and the 
containment policy did more harm than good to U. S. interests in the region. It alienated the 
citizenry of the Muslim world and created a “boogie man,” The Great Satan, which could be 
summoned for all manner of ideological and cultural manipulation. It was only after the demise 
of the Soviet Union that the Bush and Clinton administrations began to undertake “new 
rationalizations,” according to Hubbell, for the future. In 1997, National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake determined that “the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of 
enlargement . . . of the world’s free community of market democracies.”27 This is exactly what 
John Steinbruner had predicted and Mueller and Kreisburg had encouraged. In the new world 
order at the turn of the millennium, commercial and economic considerations and the promotion 
of democracy were strategies that the United States could have and should have developed. The 
damage to US credibility by then was clear and the ramifications of the policy of containment of 
Communism were evident.  
 “Nations, like individuals, “asserts John Lewis Gaddis “tend to be prisoners of their 
pasts.”28 The policy of containment is a case in point. The ideological confrontation of capitalism 
and Communism notwithstanding, the fact of the matter is that the two superpowers succumbed 
to the realist notion of spheres of influence in an attempt to protect the hegemony that each was 
able to exercise in that sphere. The Soviet preoccupation with its “near abroad” (those areas lying 
in the shadow of the Soviet state and defined by the historical forces that shaped Russian foreign 
policy) as well as the repeated invasions by European powers throughout the previous centuries, 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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lent an air of necessity to the Soviet preoccupation with those areas that had been asserted to be, 
historically, Russian interests. Moreover, the encroachment of the Western powers into Eastern 
Europe was, for Stalin and his successors, a matter of national defense predicated on the very 
real historical fears of the invasions by Napoleon and Hitler.  
 Inasmuch as these two superpowers were busy jockeying for position during the Cold 
War, the strategic importance of the Middle East (both in terms of location at the periphery of the 
USSR and its abundance of petroleum reserves) was paramount to the need for control of the 
Middle East by the US and the USSR. Yet there was no clear cut need for containment of a 
region that was, arguably non-politicized and undeveloped peoples?). The unintended 
consequences of the policy of containment such as the alienation of the Muslim world were only 
likely to inflame the local populations against either party at the expense of both with total 
disregard to the political desires of either. Islam condemns both Communism (as Godless) and 
capitalism (as foreign to their culture). 
Capitalism was never in danger of capitulation to Marxism because culturally the West 
was guided in many places by a protestant work ethic every bit as powerful as the sway that 
Islam holds over its adherents. “The Soviet Union did not insist on imposing Communist 
governments everywhere within its sphere of influence - Finland”29 and the Middle East were 
both notable exceptions. “Nor did the United States, as the case of Yugoslavia showed, consign 
to the outer darkness all Communist states. In general, though, and with increasing frequency as 
time went on, ideology did become the mechanism by which alignments were drawn in the Cold 
War – even to the point that the United States neglected, for many years, the possibility of 
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cooperating with the People’s Republic of China in a task in which both had a strong interest, 
namely containing the Russians.”30 Thus, what began as a policy of political containment 
spiraled out of control into opposing ideologies for the purposes of domestic pacification by both 
the Soviets and the Americans in an effort to maintain the status quo. 
 This policy of containment of Communism was no more than an unrelenting 
confrontation masquerading as statesmanship by politicians who understand Islam any better 
than they understood Communism and are advocating policies that are questionable at best in 
light of their ignorance of the facts. Speaking at his inauguration in January 1961, President John 
F. Kennedy stated that the US “would pay any price and bear any burden, meet any hardship, 
support any friend, oppose any foes”31 to keep the world free from Communism. President 
Lyndon B. Johnson cashed the check that Kennedy had written by dramatically increasing the 
numbers of troops in Vietnam. By 1968, there were over 500,000 US soldiers in a “police 
action” that was never declared a war by the US Congress and resulted in the deaths of nearly 
sixty thousand American soldiers. Additionally, the conflict in Vietnam strained the fabric of 
American society in a way that hadn’t occurred since the American Civil War a hundred years 
earlier. However, the domino rationalization never came to fruition and Communism abroad 
slowly broke under its own weight despite containment. US troops have been in Afghanistan 
longer than any other war in which the nation has been involved historically. No dramatic change 
in Afghanistan seems to have been achieved, however, despite the time, blood, and treasure of a 
nation now weary of war. The recent diplomacy engaged by the leaders of the US and Iran, by 
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contrast, has achieved what many thought impossible; the nonproliferation of nuclear arms by 
Iran, the release of US hostages, and the beginning of the same kind of rapprochement that 
diplomacy has achieved the normalization of relations with Cuba as well. Diplomacy 
acknowledges the value and arguments of both sides and is more constructive in the end. 
The fall of Saigon signified an American defeat that left nationwide psychological scars 
for years to come. It inspired mass political mobilizations, and has divided supporters and 
opponents even up to the present day. It also highlighted the emergence of the media, as Vietnam 
was the first televised war. The US bombing of Vietnam and Cambodia and the associated 
atrocities in that “police action” brought widespread condemnation from around the world as 
well and caused considerable, lasting harm to America’s image abroad. The US involvement in 
Vietnam was the most costly application of the containment strategy in the Third World and 
judgments on the morality of that policy typically rests on an assumption about the threat posed 
by Communism and the US response. The blood and treasure lost in that conflict paled beside 
the loss of prestige both at home and abroad. At home, the term “Vietnam Syndrome” entered 
into the national lexicon, meaning that the United States should never engage in military conflict 
far from home without clear, viable, political objectives, public support, and an exit strategy for 
the military. Not until the Powell Doctrine would those issues be addressed. However, it could 
not have been made clearer that containment had been rendered obsolete by the inability of US 
policymakers to consider another policy. The strategic arms limitation talks, SALT I and SALT 
II, initiated during the Johnson administration and continued by Richard Nixon were diplomatic 
initiatives designed to limit nuclear weapons that serve as a constructive demonstration of the 
value and efficacy of diplomacy. “For the first time during the Cold War, the United States and 
Soviet Union had agreed to limit the number of nuclear missiles in their arsenals. SALT I is 
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considered the crowning achievement of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente.”32 It was the 
template for the talks between Reagan and Gorbachev more than a decade later in Reykjavik. 
   This brings me to the second aspect of my argument: the unintended consequences of 
the reconciliation of that failed experiment in containment. Both Kupchan and Hermann have 
asserted that these factors coalesced more in the Middle East than anywhere in the twentieth 
century - most probably as a function of regional oil wealth - in that the support of brutal 
dictatorships fostered hatred toward both superpowers. The confluence of the American foreign 
policy of containment of Communism and the harvesting of the material wealth of the region 
only served to create a hotbed of animosity toward the West. Historical, political, and economic 
factors have converged, in the twentieth century, to reflect the failures of containment as well as 
the clash of civilizations. The random borders created in the Middle East after World War I, the 
support of brutal dictatorships to rule those proxy states to either support or stifle Communism, 
and the extraction of the mineral wealth in the form of petroleum has alienated the Islamic world 
to such an extent that it has fostered a visceral hatred there toward the West which has been 
fueled by passionate theocrats intent on recreating the Middle East as a neo pan-Islamic 
theocracy. To that end those most invested in the transformation are not above employing the 
same tactics in which the two superpowers engaged in their own agenda.  
  Divisions between states based on political, economic, and historical factors in the 
Muslim world was a key point of this analysis based on biases of the political elites need to 
“simplify complex events and to shape incoming information to pre-existing conceptual 
frameworks.”33 The relevant questions here are, therefore, was the policy of containment a moral 
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one, and what were the paradoxical effects of that morally suspect foreign policy? If the United 
States promotes liberalism domestically and abroad, then we owe it to the world to at least 
examine American foreign policy both morally as well as from the standpoint of efficacy. Yet 
there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the US policy of containment of Communism 
was neither moral nor efficacious. As I stated earlier, the brutal dictatorships supported by the 
superpowers in the Middle East terrorized their subjects. They were supported because they 
provided access to the mineral wealth of the region. They did so through the use of tactics 
designed to foster only divisions within the societies over which ruled. Moreover, those 
Machiavellian manipulations served to sow the seeds of the rise of Islamic fundamentalists that 
fanned the anger created and focused that animosity for their own ends.   
 This brings us back to Fleming's The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917 – 1960 in which he 
frames the questions of the morality of the policy of containment in depth. “Was it moral,” he 
asks, “to go to the other side of the earth to build many-sided hostile walls around the two largest 
people’s in the world; to deplete our own economy and society dangerously threatened by nearly 
a trillion dollars of cold-war military expenditures, while verging upon international bankruptcy; 
to proscribe all revolutions in the world, lest they turn Communist, and ally ourselves with 
socially oppressive and obsolete groups everywhere; to ignore the mounting evidence of social 
evolution and achievement in Communist lands; to maneuver the Congress into giving four 
blank checks for world war; and to violate both the United Nations and Organization of 
American States (OAS) charters as well as the oldest rules of international law?”34 Fleming and 
has argued that it “was the proclamation of the universal doctrine of containment, so foreign to 
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our entire national history until 1946, and its prosecution, first against the Soviet Union and then 
against China, which became the great immorality of the postwar world.”35 Fleming’s 
ruminations bring into stark contrast the murky problems of the foreign policy questions of the 
United States, their efficacy and the moral foundations upon which they are based - with very 
real implications for this nation’s future because of those decisions. The overarching question is 
that of the efficacy and morality of containment of Islamic fundamentalism via the same policy 
used to “contain” Communism. Zachary Karabell, in The Wrong Threat: The United States and 
Islamic Fundamentalism writes that, “In theory, it is possible to isolate two distinct views. On 
one side, there is a belief that Islamic fundamentalism is the new Communism and consequently 
must be opposed with whatever means are necessary to contain the fundamentalist threat. An 
adjunct of this view is that Islamic fundamentalism is the vanguard of a coming civilizational 
clash between the West and the Muslim world.”36 National interests must be defended but it is 
imperative that foreign policy debates consider the morality of decisions that will determine the 
future of US interests in the region and what effect they may have on the flexibility of future 
administrations. This is important because to do otherwise threatens to poison the waters of 
future relationships with emerging democratic movements in the Middle East. European colonial 
interference in the Middle East is an obvious example of that assertion. The jumble of 
haphazardly drawn borders in the Middle East by Britain, France, and the other victors after WW 
I have been a catalyst for sectarian unrest that continues to this day.  
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The political interventions of the European powers towards the Middle East have been 
well documented over time. Perhaps nowhere better is this done than in David Fromkin’s, A 
Peace to End All Peace, in which he details the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of 
the modern Middle East. The author illustrates how the European Allies came to remake the 
geography and politics of the Middle East, drawing lines on an empty map that eventually 
became the new countries of Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon and focusing on the formative 
years of 1914 to 1922, when everything – even an alliance between Arab nationalism and 
Zionism – seemed possible and oil was not a political issue. Indeed, “Fromkin shows how the 
choices narrowed and the Middle East began along a road that led to the endless wars and the 
escalating acts of terrorism that continue to this day.”37 His work also highlights the confluence 
of the containment of Communism in the Middle East with the end of the colonial period as oil 
became the new international currency and the politics in defense of US interests. Fromkin notes 
that containment was also a means to deny the Soviet Union access to the major oil producing 
states in the Middle East. The debate over whether containment was so tainted from the 
beginning can fail to have had unintended consequences is one-sided. Recall Hubbell’s38 
admonishment that containment was singularly ill-suited to these specific considerations. 
Containment was a myth based on Eurocentric descriptions of borders without regard to Muslim 
considerations to confront an ideology already anathema to Muslim mores. The ill-intended 
consequences of those misplaced foreign policy decisions have been all the yeast required for the 
rise of Islamic fanaticism, as a backlash to containment grew in the Muslim world. The United 
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States sowed the seeds of its own antagonism. Containment reflected a different colonizing 
approach, albeit one that retained elements of colonialism and post colonialism or elements of 
occupation that gave rise Islamic fundamentalism. 
Simply stated, the Islamic peoples of the world put little stock in US foreign policy 
because they had also borne the brunt of proxy status in a war that had little to do with them in 
the first place. These newly created states Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and to some 
extent Israel, were made proxies for, first Europe and then, the United States and the Soviet 
Union (Syria) in the Cold War. But recall also Hubbell’s well-founded assertion that the Arab 
states proved to be nearly impervious to Moscow’s ideological appeal, and the containment 
policy of the US did more harm than good to US national interests in the region over time. US 
policymakers had little ground intelligence and lacked the cultural nuance to control many 
aspects of containment effectively. Muslims in the Middle East had no need of an ideology that 
eschewed their religion. The current global jihad against the West invokes the precepts of Allah 
in their cause against the United States as a remedy for past grievances often rooted in Islamic 
precepts of theological differences. It was the embrace of Islamic symbolism such as the initial 
spread of Islam in the seventh century at the point of a sword, which would impel Middle 
Eastern fundamentalists such as Wahhabis to respond to containment violently through fatwahs 
and jihad. The Truman Doctrine stoked an atmosphere of hate so raw and with such phenomenal 
ability to incite across the Muslim world that Islamic extremism has become the new political 
threat to the US due to the post WW I political interference upon which Fromkin elaborates at 
length. For example, in what is now northern Iraq, “the British envisaged a series of autonomous 
Kurdish states, to be advised by British political officers, which the French were asked to 
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concede in the Wilsonian spirit of self determination.”39 Clearly, however, there was no real 
attempt to encourage self-determination but rather an effort to undermine that very notion from 
the start. 
 The creation of the modern Middle East goes back to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 
1916 which “was approved by the British and French Cabinets at the beginning of February . . . 
and achieved what [Lord] Kitchener, at least, wanted to achieve; the containment of Russia in the 
postwar Middle East.”40 Fromkin argues that the European powers conspired against the will of 
many foreign governments to divide up the Middle East into protectorates of European 
domination. This was done, as Fromkin makes clear, through the parochial interests of a single 
judge; Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, the 1st Earl of Khartoum. This was just another step in 
the reinforcement of the historical memory of the Muslim world against the West and another 
leap in the building of anti-Westernism in the Middle East. The strategy of the European powers 
in the Middle East was simple: divide and conquer. 
 Nineteenth century European Middle East policy was the American template for the US 
Middle Eastern policy of the twentieth century such as efforts to pit opposing Arab states against 
one another in an attempt to distract those nations’ citizenry that they were being controlled from 
abroad. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was, and has been well documented as a secret negotiation 
by the European powers to dictate their will upon the sovereign nations of the Middle East in the 
name of containment of Russia. “The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, for example, provided for 
Britain and France to divide up the Arabic-speaking Middle East. Other agreements provided for 
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Russia and Italy to annex portions of what is now Turkey.”41 Containment was predicated upon 
the ancient fears of the European powers, fear of both colonialism and imperial power. Those 
fears would echo through time and are today manifested in attacks in both Europe and America. 
President Woodrow Wilson recognized the warning sign on his way to Paris to initiate his 
14 points including a League of Nations. “In off the record comments aboard ship en route to the 
peace conferences in 1919,  Wilson told his associates that “I am convinced that if this peace is 
not made on the highest of principles of justice, it will be swept away by the peoples of the world 
in less than a generation.”42 Though Wilson’s foresight was premature it was also prescient. The 
defender of liberty in the US also understood the need to engage liberalism abroad in the best 
interest of the US There was at least a reason to suspect the American policy of “containment” 
was ineffective and immoral from the standpoint of American values. That morally-suspect 
policy was a European reaction to Bolshevism and represented the vanguard of the containment 
of Communism and the continuation of The Great Game between the European powers and 
Russia. However, it also led to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the name of the cultural 
guardianship of Islam and to self-determination by Muslims who lived under the yoke of a 
predetermined future which was predicated, as has been documented above, on control of the 
region for political control and material gain in the form of mineral and oil wealth.   
 David Fromkin is quick to point out that “[t]he West and the Middle East have 
misunderstood each other throughout most of the twentieth century; and much of that 
misunderstanding can be traced back to Lord Kitchener’s initiatives in the early years of the First 
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World War.”43 The uninformed rationalization of Kitchener, that Islam was a monolith spreading 
a pan-Islamic message to all its adherents equally, was exactly the kind of thinking that fostered 
a sense of anxiety in the West (Kitchener, David Lloyd George, and French Premier George 
Clemenceau).44 Lack of understanding and knowledge encouraged the Western powers to paint 
with broad strokes their responses to the native populations’ clamor for a more self-determinate 
governments and ignored the promises that the Europeans had made to various tribes and clans 
in each of the newly-created Middle Eastern states. Muslims hated the Communists but they 
especially hated the duplicitous Western countries more, as it became clear to them that Western 
influence was no better than Russian dominance. 
In fact, there were reported problems in holding Arabs together even for the purpose of 
revolt against the Soviets. As the leaders of the Western European nations promised the people 
of the Middle East an eventual timeline of self rule they also, tacitly, undermined those promises 
through political subterfuge. “Besides, the promise was an easy one to make; it was a territory 
that none of the Great Powers coveted. David Lloyd George later wrote that “no one 
contemplated that foreign troops should occupy any part of Arabia. It was too arid a country to 
make it worth the while of any ravenous Power [sic] to occupy as a permanent pasture.” It was 
not known then, however, that there were immense deposits of oil in the region.”45 And therein 
lays the current source of Western anxiety in a region consumed by animosity for the US. 
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Kupchan accurately concludes that the formulation of policy was “left to generalists at the top of 
the hierarchy – individuals with little or no regional expertise who are predisposed to view 
events within an East-West framework.”46 Political considerations of Muslim issues have taken a 
back seat to Western interests at the expense of those interests and it is clear that much was 
unknown or unconsidered by the Europeans with regard to the Middle East. Thus, the unintended 
consequences of Russian/Soviet containment were a direct result of faulty intelligence and 
misunderstanding of the region and the culture. Indeed, in response to Kitchener’s tactics in 
Turkey British Attorney General Sir Edward Carson wrote another colleague, stating that 
“[w]hat I feel so acutely about is that all our calculations (if we can dignify them by that name) 
are absolutely haphazard.”47 The Truman Doctrine was based on the flawed containment 
doctrine of the post World War I European powers that, as I have demonstrated, was envisioned 
by uninformed politicians and academicians in both Europe and America with unintended 
consequences for the Middle East with regard to those powers’ interests because they never truly 
cared about Arab interests in the least. They were also culturally insensitive to the mores of 
Islam and that led to the misinformed doctrine of containment in a region that with well-
intentioned diplomacy might have eagerly embraced the opportunity to oppose a secular 
Communist ideology in favor of a partnership with Christian-based nations who shared the same 
God of Abraham. Though the nature of the situation was accurately perceived, a la Kupchan, the 
political response was inappropriate and has resulted in complex policy initiatives that defy 
political expectations in the region because they were based on coercion and not partnership and 
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respect. That relationship has been the defining nature of the perception of the West by the 
Islamic world in the Middle East.  
John O. Beahrs described these moments in history as the paradoxical effects of political 
systems and asserts that they “often complicate public policy, contrary to expectation or intent. 
Some are unavoidable,” he went on to write, and though “effective actions require constructs that 
simplify the more complex . . . what is omitted often yields unexpected effects.”48 Beahrs 
understated the implications of these effects in light of their importance to Kupchan’s earlier 
research when he equivocates that they complicate natural processes and intentional 
interventions alike. The two are not one and the same. What he suggests is that there are 
unintended consequences to any public policy. He is more clear when he announces that when “a 
tripartite process often occurs in which a specific social evil” [in this case Communism] “is 
defined as unacceptable, specific correctives are implemented,” [containment] “and instead of 
the expected or desired outcome, the underlying evil worsens, related new ones emerge, or the 
same problem reappears in different form or at some other level – sometimes with greater 
malignancy,” such as acts of terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists throughout the globe.49 Beahrs 
contribution to this analysis is the effort and ability to identify the main factors leading to 
unintended consequences with some thoughts on mitigating their outcomes. He acknowledged 
three factors that unavoidably lead to paradoxical effects in political systems and are championed 
by this thesis. 
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 Uncertainty in political maneuverings based on the self-deception of policy-makers who 
exclude relevant information are at the heart of many of the flawed decisions that have created 
the foundation for Muslim animosity toward the West today. “First are roots of uncertainty 
inherent in all of the human sciences; complex causality, tension between polar opposites, and 
value priorities.”50 Each of these factors can be either exacerbated or mitigated by the exclusion 
of relevant information which can then lead to the unexpected effects. For example, the 
culturally uninformed position of the British regarding the Middle East after World War I, in 
terms of the non-monolithic nature of the Arab world, or the inability of the British to 
acknowledge that a devout Muslim community would never consider embracing the secular 
Communist ideology. The uncertainty that led them to over-engagement of the containment 
strategy, which did indeed play a role in what should have been a revision of the Truman 
Doctrine, is clearly documented by Fromkin.51 
“Second, collective self-deceptions markedly increase the potential for paradoxical 
effects,”52  Beahrs declared. Both the British and the French, as well as the US government after 
World War II, miscalculated the ability of the USSR to achieve the industrial gains of the West 
after World Wars I and II and clung desperately to the realist ideology that emphasized 
realpolitik over calculated diplomacy.. It was ridiculous, however, to believe that the Soviets’ 
centralized economy could compete with Keynesian economics. The US based its defense of 
containment on that and failed to observe its most basic credo; that market economics was the 
best indicator of economic success. 
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Third, “exclusion of relevant information is further accentuated by large-scale social 
traumata,” Beahrs finally argues. The British deceived the French and themselves as easily as 
Woodrow Wilson promised the peoples of the world a kinder and gentler approach based on 
political freedoms that the colonial powers were not prepared to extend. Thus, the uncertainty of 
complex variables, the paradoxical effects that they have upon outcomes, and the parochial 
practice of self-defense in defense of realist policies, all contributed to the foment of unintended 
consequences in the Muslim world that led to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle 
East. 
The tension between liberalism, realism, and socialism/Communism was so distinctive in 
the WW I era and beyond that schools of political science began to spring up in an effort to 
Darwinize the science of politics. The better adapted ideology would reign. The entire twentieth 
century has been about conflicts between polar opposites, relieving tensions between groups; 
self-deception for the purpose of placating ourselves to one degree or another. American and 
Russian leaders have at various times throughout that period declared that the political ideology 
of each would overcome the others.53 This may have been the most violent and precipitous era of 
warfare, both hot and Cold, with long-term implications for our national interests based on John 
O. Beahrs’ studied view of that landscape. The scholars cited here support the assertion that the 
duplicity of realism has undermined the unity of liberalism. 
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The French deceived the British, the Russians, and the Italians, regarding their intentions 
in the Middle East. The US government deceived themselves about the prospects for peace in a 
world that was too close to its colonial past and too far removed from modern liberal ideologies 
of today.54 Moreover, the US government was constrained by isolationist tendencies that had 
animated US foreign policy since the Revolutionary War. In fact, the only groups who did not 
deceive themselves were the Muslims of the Islamic world. They were all too aware of the 
duplicity being foisted upon them by the western world and what containment of Communism 
entailed for their future. Clearly, what cannot be denied is that for centuries, nations have 
exercised a level of political self-interest that undermines our modern-day ideas of transparency 
and is a remnant of realism. I assert that Lincoln, Steinbruner, McGwire, Mueller and Fromkin, 
Gaddis and even Kennan, would agree with this line of thought. Kupchan, Karabell, and 
Hermann concur. 
 Part of Sykes’ problem “was that he did not know which of his colleagues were in favor 
of what; he did not understand that some of them kept their motives and plans hidden. In 
confidential conferences and correspondence with trusted British colleagues, he felt he could 
express his views openly and fully, and wrongly assumed that they felt the same way.” Faced 
with professional and bureaucratic self-preservation from his own peers, Sykes could never 
understand the simple previously quoted maxim of Abraham Lincoln - that “if we could first 
know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could then better judge, what to do, and how 
to do it.” Sykes was a fervent advocate of British Imperialism without regard to consequence or 
the ability to transcend the present and inform the future. He failed to grasp the notion that every 
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action has an equal and opposite reaction and the political implications of misinformation could 
alter the balance of power in a profound and lasting way. 
French Premier Georges Clemenceau understood that fact no better. His representative, 
François Georges Picot, had come to London in 1915 in order to muzzle the Russians. Reflecting 
the notions of The Great Game and presaging the idea of the buffer states of Eastern Europe post 
World War II, Picot declared that “[t]he French zone was to provide Britain with a shield against 
Russia. France and Russia would be balanced one against the other, so that the Middle East, like 
the Great Wall of China, would protect the British Middle East from attack by the Russian 
barbarians to the North.”55 The British and the French were woefully underprepared to do so 
either, and the result was the antagonism of the people of the Islamic world with implications for 
future endeavors by the West in the Middle East. 
The unintended consequences of those past policy decisions have come back to thwart 
the best expectations of US foreign policy in the present because it was predicated on an unstable 
foundation of real-politick. Realpolitik is about stability in theory but that foundation was 
undermined by the flawed notion that coercion of the Arab states to serve as nothing more than a 
natural barrier of sand between antagonists was every bit as flawed as the Soviets use of Eastern 
Europe to do the same. Yet containment of Communism, as first described by the few scribbled 
notes of George Kennan in response to a misunderstood ideology, was the basis for an entire half 
century of misguided implementation of foreign policy. Rather, US policy-makers could have 
cultivated effective partners in the Middle East in Afghanistan as they did during the Soviet 
occupation there.  
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Chapter Two:  
The Proxy State System and the Balance of Power 
 
This second chapter examines the historic forces that sowed the seeds of discontent in the 
Middle East as a function of the proxy state system instituted there by the two superpowers of 
the Cold War: the United States and the Soviet Union. Having considered the historical forces of 
Europe at work in the Middle East in Chapter I - I now turn my attention to those at work in the 
Arab world. Concurrently, I also note the beginning of the failure of socialism/Communism 
outside of the borders of the Soviet Union and the increasingly anachronistic nature of the 
Truman Doctrine. The Cold War gave rise to feelings of empowerment in the Middle East that 
crystallized around the idea that, for the first time in centuries, the people of the Arab world 
potentially held their own future in their hands. No longer content to be pawns of the West the 
states of the Middle East began, haltingly at first, to take control of their own destinies - a slow 
process to be sure but one which would change the nature of American national priorities. 
 When President Jimmy Carter toasted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, calling Iran an 
“island of stability” in the Middle East, it was not because the president had pressured the Shah 
to do the bidding of the US Pahlavi had been acquainted with eight presidents as far back as 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and had actively lobbied for fighter jets, naval assets and military 
equipment over the course of his monarchy, including a state-of-the-art radar system to safeguard 
Iranian airspace from Soviet bombers. His objective was to secure the leadership of Iran in the 
Persian Gulf and Middle East. “The US also trained Iranian pilots and built several intelligence 
gathering outposts in the northern mountains of Iran, designed to track Soviet Missile tests and 
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intercept Soviet military communications.”56 The relationship between Tehran and Washington 
was mutually advantageous and had been sought and nurtured by both Iran and the United States. 
Iran was considered a stalwart supporter of the US 
 While it is obvious that the state of Israel, which owed its very existence to the billions of 
dollars in foreign aid from the United States, would always be a partner in the Middle East, what 
was not clear after World War II was the direction of the political winds throughout the Arab 
world. The Israeli question was considerable but I am not convinced that it could not have been 
overcome by winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim people four decades before the fall of 
the USSR and the Eastern-bloc. Here again, the containment policy/doctrine was a factor. Even 
though the Americans need not have feared Arab capitulation to the Soviet Union (the Arabs had 
no desire to become Kremlin satellites after all), successive US administrations made every 
effort to forcefully coerce the Middle Eastern states into the pro-democracy/capitalist camp. 
They engaged that process while supporting the state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian 
diaspora. That was the monumental miscalculation of US policy-makers and resulted in an arms 
race in the region that destabilized the Middle East for decades. Yet I maintain that the enmity 
between the Arab states and Israel could have been overcome or avoided completely. Arab-
Israeli conflicts were also among the unintended consequences of the Truman Doctrine’s policy 
of containment.  
For his part, Nuri al-Sa’id, a former premiere of Iraq and signatory to the Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty, (which, as a step toward greater independence, granted Britain the unlimited right to 
station its armed forces in and transit military units through Iraq) also courted the United States’ 
arms shipments. Soviet involvement in Iran’s domestic agenda had fueled Nuri’s suspicions of 																																																								
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the Communist state and drew Iraq closer to the West. Those “arms shipments would focus the 
[Iraqi] officers’ attention on a professional task, professionally conceived, and would be a visible 
proof of the relative advantage of alignment with the Western powers.”57 The efforts of the West, 
led by the US, were geared toward stoking the fear of the Arab states of the Soviet Union in an 
effort to serve the foreign policy directives of the Truman Doctrine, not the agenda of the Arabs 
or the Persians. This was the first fundamental failure of the policy of containment. The US used 
its allies in the Middle East for its own agenda without regard to its commitments to those proxy 
states. 
 Conversely, unlike the foreign distractions faced by Iran, Iraq and other Middle Eastern 
states, Saudi Arabia was beholden to the US for its protection from internal groups that 
threatened to topple the House of Saud which has ruled the oil-rich Monarchy since World War 
I. It is important to note, however, that the protection of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia was 
purely pragmatic and served the needs of the United States policy of containment of 
Communism just as well as the outwardly focused efforts of the US into the other Arab states in 
the region. The location of vast amounts of the world’s oil reserves in Saudi Arabia also made 
the kingdom a strategic target that the United States shepherded for its own national interests. 
The six-month oil embargo of 1973 – 1974 clarified to the US Congress that a fine line must be 
drawn between the political support for Israel and that of the House of Saud. This was the second 
fundamental failure of the containment strategy. The US failed to honor its own commitment 
abroad to the concept upon which it was based; democracy. However, economic imperatives 
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were prioritized over the political (but obviously parallel) objective of containing Soviet 
expansion. 
President Jimmy Carter reaffirmed that stance after what he had called the “island of 
stability” in Iran fell to students in Tehran and the Shah was forced to flee. It was by then 
becoming clear to American leaders that internal threats to states like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and 
Iran were every bit as serious as the threats posed by Moscow and the Red Army to the United 
States. Indeed, as previously noted, the rising tide of discontent in the Arab world was creating a 
new grassroots force that was fueled by the discontent of the Arab people and informed by the 
manipulations of the American and Soviet governments alike. The thinking of the US 
government at the time was that Soviet socialism would ultimately fail, but there seemed to be 
little indication of that before 1989. With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Islamic 
fundamentalist and extremist factions within the Muslim world turned their attentions to the sole 
remaining antagonist to the interests of pan-Islamism: the United States. This was the third 
failure of containment: the absence of the Communist threat, the foundation of US policy in the 
region, left a conspicuous void for US policy-makers. Containment had coveted and supported 
Middle Eastern allies against a common enemy, Soviet expansionism. After 1991 that common 
enemy was gone. 
American efforts to line up states like Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia against the USSR were 
being met with an internal reaction in those states that had been the unintended consequence of 
the creation of Israel. The manipulation of Middle Eastern domestic affairs (which was viewed 
by many in the Arab world as an intolerable interference) and reaction in the Muslim world to 
the subjugation of the Arab people by their despotic leaders at the behest of the US became the 
overarching interest in the Muslim world. “After the fall of the Shah in 1979, and the hostage 
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crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan . . . the United States pursued three objectives in the 
Persian Gulf: to keep the Soviet Union out . . . to contain Islamic Revolution, and to protect the 
oil fields and assure the free flow of inexpensive oil.”58 Indeed, Carter facilitated that policy by 
ordering the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in March 1980 to protect US 
vital interests by all means necessary, including military options if need be. It would become 
apparent to Middle Eastern states that the foremost agenda being served was that of the 
economic interests of the United States. 
Clearly the USSR was still a viable threat to the US in the mid 1980s, as the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated. And as the Islamic revolution in Iran was unfolding, the 
Red Army was committing atrocities in Afghanistan that were being quietly ignored worldwide 
(even as Americans watched in horror as 53 Americans were held hostage in the capital of 
Tehran). At the same time “entire Soviet divisions were sweeping into highly populated valleys 
[in Afghanistan], killing everything they could find – people and livestock – and destroying 
irrigation and crops.”59 The invasion of Afghanistan was, however, a Soviet reaction to the 
containment policy in which the US was engaged throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf. 
Thus, it can be said to have been yet another consequence of the extension of the Truman 
Doctrine into that region. 
In March 1979 the US backed a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. The Soviet 
leadership saw the agreement as a major advantage for the United States. One Soviet newspaper 
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stated that Egypt and Israel were now “gendarmes of the Pentagon.”60 The Soviets viewed the 
treaty not only as a peace agreement between their erstwhile allies in Egypt and the US which 
supported Israelis, but also as a military pact. In addition, the US sold more than 5,000 missiles 
to Saudi Arabia and also supplied the Royalists in the North Yemen Civil War against the 
Communist rebellion there. Moreover, the Soviet Union's previously strong relations with Iraq 
had recently soured. In June 1978 Iraq began entering into friendlier relations with the Western 
world and buying French and Italian made weapons, though the vast majority still came from the 
Soviet Union, their Warsaw Pact allies, and China.61 It was becoming clear that the pressure that 
was being exerted on the Soviet Union was beginning to have pronounced effects. Rather than 
scale back the containment policy, however, the Reagan administration, with the assistance of 
Republicans in Congress, chose to ramp up both anti-Communist rhetoric as well as arms sales to 
Middle Eastern states. The backlash by the Soviet Union against that policy was the Afghan 
invasion. This was not the result that was intended. 
 There were also considerations of regional strategy influencing the Soviet decision to 
intervene in Afghanistan. “The Kremlin wanted to control Afghanistan in order to strengthen its 
hand with neighbors, notably Pakistan and Iran, which were openly hostile toward Soviet policy 
not only in Afghanistan but elsewhere in Asia. The Kremlin believed also that Pakistan's 
conservative government was clandestinely aiding the Afghan insurgents.”62 The encirclement of 
Pakistan by the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet states like India and a contingent of Afghanis 																																																								
60 . Minton F. Goldman, Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan: Roots & Causes, 
Polity, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Spring, 1984), pp. 384-403. 
 
61. Ibid. p. 394. 
 
62. Ibid, p. 390. 
 
49 
	
make that belief by the Russians plausible. “These circumstances had led Pakistan, to the 
Kremlin's considerable annoyance, to befriend China and to look to the United States and other 
Western countries for military assistance.”63 When the Reagan administration agreed to sell F-16 
fighter jets to the Pakistanis it was with the understanding that the F-16 sale was good for the 
Pakistanis and the Afghanis and, better still, bad for the Soviets.64 The hallmarks of the realist 
theory of band-wagoning were evident throughout the region, with the United States lining up 
their proxies against the Soviet Union and the Soviet client states in the region lined up against 
the US Control of Afghanistan effectively gave the Soviets control over two of Iran’s borders 
and created a base of operations from which to launch a full scale strike on Iran in an effort to 
take control of the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets 
might have been a more important event than anyone dared to admit at the time and could have 
had broader repercussions than anyone could have imagined. That is why the Reagan 
administration felt that it must continue to undermine the Soviet position throughout the Middle 
East. However, it would have been better for the US to have encouraged the Muslim world to 
counter the USSR and keep those Muslim states antagonistic toward one another rather than 
toward the US The Arab concept of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” would have had 
greater effect and been better understood in the Arab world than the economic and political 
aspects that containment was designed to defend against. 
It is easier to look back in retrospect and declare that the international community should 
have seen the looming problems in the Middle East and the Soviet Union. And while some 
scholars did, most were taken by complete surprise when, first, the Eastern European states 																																																								
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disentangled themselves from Soviet dominance in 1989 and, then, when the USSR itself 
imploded two years later. There were those who had already been positing questions about the 
Soviet Union, such as: “Are its problems, that all agree exist, so severe that it is susceptible to 
pressure? What are the limits to Soviet capacities? Does the Soviet Union have opportunities 
relative to others or not? Are its aggressive and imperial acts symptomatic of perceived threat or 
perceived opportunity?”65 The fact is that the unintended consequences of Reagan’s effort to 
undermine the Soviet Union also created a vacuum of power within the region that Islamic 
fundamentalists filled with relative ease. This is not the level of predictability that many 
adherents of realism saw as the virtue of the embrace of power politics when dealing with the 
Soviets. However, the real threat to the US would be the decline of the Soviet Union so 
precipitously that a power vacuum was created. As the USSR crumbled and the United States 
began to withdraw the balance of power in the region shifted. That balance of power had 
sustained stability in the Gulf States throughout most of the twentieth century. The failure of 
Communism was the foundation for the rise of Islam against the West. Had realism truly ruled 
the day then this could have been avoided by balancing the two antagonists against one another. 
That is the final and most grotesque failure of containment. It is inconceivable that no one in the 
US government could predict that possible turn of events. 
Nineteen seventy-nine seems to have been the turning point for many Middle Eastern 
states and actors. During the Carter administration the American embassy was overtaken by 
student protestors and the captives taken there were held for 444 days. The Iranian revolution 
overthrew the Shah of Iran and his monarchy. “When the Ayatollah Khomeini established in Iran 																																																								
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the first Islamic republic in history and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and began killing 
Muslims en masse, few who knew [Osama] bin Laden could have ever imagined him emerging 
one day as the undisputed leader of Sunni Islamic jihadists, the architect of the deadliest terrorist 
attacks in American history, and the charismatic hero of Radicals around the globe be they 
Sunnis or Shias.”66 This confluence of events laid the groundwork for the paradigm shift from 
the primacy of the containment of Communism to that of the recognition of Islamic 
fundamentalism as the new unknown variable. For in truth, the revolution in Iran as well as the 
eventual defeat of the Russians in Afghanistan, albeit with American aid, was a turning point in 
the awakening of the Muslim mindset that inspired a new sense of purpose in the Islamic world.  
Besides Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, other states in the Middle East were drawn into 
conflict through proximity to Israel (and the subsequent absorption of the Palestinian refugees 
after each conflict there), or war with Israel and the conflicts that arose as a result of pressure 
between these states. “Although it is often forgotten today, the Syrian army entered Lebanon in 
1976 with US encouragement and tacit Israeli agreement. Washington and Jerusalem hoped that 
the Syrians could stop Lebanon's 1975-1976 civil war.”67 Yet the backdrop for all of this activity 
was the US/USSR dichotomy that defined their separate ideologies and the use of these Middle 
Eastern pawns to further their own agendas. Syria exemplifies this new multivariate relationship.  
On at least two occasions Damascus sought guarantees of Soviet military support, should 
further fighting break out between Lebanese sects in the Shuf Mountains. “The first request was 
made, according to reliable sources, during the Druze-Lebanese army fighting in the Shuf 
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Mountains in September 1983, when US firepower directly supported Beirut's units. After the 
truck-bomb attack on the US Marine Corps headquarters in Beirut one month later, the Syrians 
again asked the Soviets how Moscow would react if Syria countered American retaliatory attacks 
on Syrian targets by action against the US fleet. Moscow told Damascus to stay calm.”68 The 
Soviets were in no position to fight the United States, even indirectly, on yet another front. 
Economically they were strapped and the war in Afghanistan was by no means a fait accompli. 
In 1982 the Israeli army invaded Lebanon after Israel received what it understood as a 
green light from Washington to act against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 
southern Lebanon. After the war ended, the United States was also drawn into the Lebanese 
morass. “But the Soviets added that if Syria itself were attacked, the USSR would use its military 
power and, according to one report, would not even shy from using tactical nuclear weapons. 
Even if this threat was simply part of a war of nerves to deter Israel, it reveals the extent of 
Moscow's own nervousness.”69 It also underscores the tenuous nature of the situation in the 
Middle East during the first four years of the Reagan administration. The second four years were 
not exactly a watershed for diplomacy either. 
As previously stated, perceptions about the Soviet Union by the American government 
were not indicative of what was really happening behind the walls of the bureaucratic state. 
Richard Herrmann raised the question in 1985 that if “perceptions of the Soviet Union really set 
up a theory-driven process that interprets data as consistent with the general theory and thus 
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determines policy preferences?”70 This is something that we must consider carefully because the 
US intelligence agencies responsible for those perceptions were widely off the mark. How then 
to explain why the policy of containment was so carefully guarded for over forty years vis-à-vis 
the Middle East? 
Herrmann notes the contention that the perceptions and personalities that dominated the 
White House during the Reagan administration were the most important variables explaining US 
foreign policy after the Cold War. Yet, in his study Herrmann found that the Soviet schema “did 
not predict policy choices in the Middle East very well.71 Hermann further concluded that the 
problem with predicting policy choices in the Middle East suggests that it is important to look 
carefully at definitions - and that other variables besides Soviet containment should have been 
considered. Attitudes toward Israel, for example, cut across the belief systems of many American 
politicians with consequences for foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East. The Reagan 
White House was firmly set against codling Moscow and the entire generation of U. S. 
presidents between Truman and George Herbert Walker Bush had been socialized to abhor the 
Communist ideology with obvious repercussions for our foreign policy debate. Thus, regardless 
of the efficacy of the policy of containment in a part of the world that clearly detested the 
“Godless” Soviet Union, the long line of US presidents took up the chant of containment as the 
focus of the American foreign policy framework. They applied it to the Middle East regardless of 
the fact that it only further alienated Muslims in the region and undermined the more serious 
concerns of the United States. Moreover, if Herrmann and Spiegel are to be believed, they did so 
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because they had been conditioned to do so as a function of their socialization, not as a function 
of what would be in the best interest of the United States. Reagan compounded that problem with 
Iran-Contra. 
Hostage-taking in the Middle East reached record proportions in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. On January 20, 1980, the day that Ronald Reagan was inaugurated, the Iranian hostages 
were freed. Following the imprisonment of members of al-Dawa, an exiled Iraqi political party 
turned militant organization, more hostages were taken throughout the Middle East, many of 
whom were American. The Iran-Contra affair began, ostensibly, to improve US-Iranian relations 
after the Islamic Revolution and the break in diplomatic relations between the two states. Israel 
was to have supplied weapons to a relatively moderate and politically influential group in Iran 
while the US would resupply Israel and accept payment from the Israelis. The Iranian recipients 
of the weapons promised to do everything in their power to achieve the release of six US 
hostages, who were being held by the Lebanese Shia Islamist group Hezbollah, and were 
unknowingly connected to the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. The plan 
eventually deteriorated into an arms-for-hostages scheme, in which members of the executive 
branch illegally sold weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of the American hostages. 
Large modifications to the plan were put in place by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the 
National Security Council in late 1985, in which a portion of the proceeds from the weapon sales 
was diverted to fund anti-Sandinista (Contras), in Nicaragua. Thus, the policy of containment 
was dictated by events in far flung threads of the Middle East, Latin America, and Washington 
D.C.72 
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 If the “new Arab” mindset came to fruition after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war then President 
Reagan’s dream of defeating the Soviets achieved containment as the decade of the 1980s 
approached its end. Ironically enough, this Arab mindset would begin its turnaround, after the 
despair of consecutive losses to the Israelis in the 1960s and ‘70s just two one or two decades 
before the fall of the USSR.73 But why did Communism collapse as a governing system in the 
first place? “Addressing the question, most Western commentators have emphasized longings for 
freedom and the economic superiority of modern capitalism. The difficulty is not that these 
explanations are wrong, but that they are too general. British and American economists, 
businessmen, and publicists have celebrated the triumph of market principles over bureaucratized 
'socialism'.”74 Charles S. Maier did not however concur with that assessment; “socialist 
economics have not always failed so clamorously.”75 The postwar reconstruction of Eastern 
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Reagan had been nicknamed by critics, survived the scandal, however, and by January 1989 a 
Gallup poll was recording a 64% approval rating, the highest ever recorded for a departing 
President at that time. This was in part because of his continued effort to undermine communism 
in Eastern Europe as well as his work with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to reduce the 
nuclear arsenals of both the US and the USSR during the Geneva Summit. While pursuing the 
placement of the final nail in the coffin of communism,  
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Europe after World War II, which was considerable, was organized through the socialist system 
of the Soviet Union and growth rates, according to the author, were comparable to those in the 
West between the 1950s and the 1970s. While acknowledging that the baseline for that growth 
was obviously less efficient than that of the West, it was, nevertheless, a workable system. 
 Maier went on to point out that the lack of the concepts of liberty and dissent in the 
Soviet sphere was antithetical to the political growth of a society. He argued that the dissent that 
did occur may have also contributed of the fall of Communism in the region. “Should not the 
inherent force of freedom, democracy, and civil courage be accepted as explanation enough of 
the breakthrough? Have these events not renewed the pre-1914 idea that history is the story of 
liberty? The difficulty is that history is not always the story of liberty, even in the modern age. 
Historical explanation is not complete unless it specifies why developments occurred when they 
did, and not earlier or later. It requires temporal determination.76 Maier echoes my analysis of the 
twentieth century and the nature of cause and effect that cannot be predictable in such a scientific 
way as to be explanatory. The consequences of American foreign policy are not always clear, 
even in hindsight. Nevertheless, some very acute minds did indeed articulate that premise. 
 Some have argued that the Reagan administration outspent the Soviets with programs like 
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This addresses only a part of the total package of crises 
that Maier declared metastasized within the Soviet regime and worked in tandem with the 
unintended consequences of containment. After Khrushchev was deposed in 196 the Soviets 
clamped down on their own dissenters and in 1968 Moscow organized an invasion of 
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Czechoslovakia. By 1981 Moscow's studied ambiguity reinforced the Polish crackdown on 
Solidarity. When Gorbachev abandoned those methods that had been used to subjugate the 
people of Eastern Europe he fell prey to what Mohsen Milani argues is the hallmark of 
revolution throughout history; the relaxation of tyranny against the citizens of a repressive state 
can, sometimes, have the unintended consequence of giving the people of that state all the 
inspiration that they need to undermine the political apparatus from below in a short and often 
violent revolution that changes the power structure and redistributes it quickly to those who seek 
change. The “velvet revolutions” of Eastern Europe were by no means the classic textbook 
definition of revolution, nor were they excessively violent, but change did come at the hands of 
Gorbachev’s unwillingness to crackdown on the dissenters.77   
  If 1979 was a watershed moment for global change because of the Islamic revolution in 
Iran, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets and the pressure on the USSR by the Reagan 
administration, in another decade a further high water mark was realized as the failing Soviet 
ideology was discredited. Islamic fundamentalism strengthened and the threat to the national 
security of the United States intensified. 1989 saw the failure of the Soviet Union to contain the 
uprisings in Eastern Europe (a precursor to the failure of the entire system of socialism in Russia 
two years later), the defeat and subsequent extraction of the Red Army from Afghanistan (which 
gave the mujahedeen fighting there a tremendous sense of empowerment), and the transition of 
the Reagan administration to the first Bush administration on January 20th of that year.  
The Soviet collapse was a reaction to forces for transformation that have gripped West 
and East alike, Maier concludes, but which Western Europeans (and North Americans) had 
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responded to earlier and thus with less cataclysmic upheaval. The most compelling pressure was 
economic. “As a beleaguered President Gorbachev told the Lithuanian Communist Party in mid-
January 1990, 'it is politics that follows economics and not vice versa.”78 This parallels the 
argument that history provides a multivariate explanation for the failure of the socialist systems 
in Eastern Europe: functions of economics, political forces that were being shaped by current 
events, and the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism that was already becoming a force for 
change throughout the Middle East. When George Herbert Walker Bush took the oath of office 
in 1989, with the same refrain of a kinder, gentler nation, he unwittingly took the reins of a new 
world order for which he was unprepared. 
  Underlying the US/USSR dichotomy at the time was the Iran-Iraq war. That conflict, 
which began in September of 1980, was one of the most gruesome events since World War II. 
The estimated death toll includes more than a million lives and another million refugees as well 
as thousands of prisoners of war taken by both sides. The costs to each country were staggering. 
The infrastructural damage to both countries was enormously high and the effects on regional 
stability were devastating. “One group of analysts argues that the primary cause was the dispute 
about the 105-kilometer-long Shatt al-Arab boundary. Another group contends that this dispute 
was a pretext for the escalation of hostilities of other sorts, all of which were non-territorial. Both 
explanations of the war's origins are inadequate, because they fail to address the full range of 
causal factors.”79 But the use of these two states as proxy nations and pawns was a policy that no 
longer bore fruit. One thing is certain, the United States was complicit in the prosecution of that 																																																								
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war inasmuch as it served the purpose of the divide and conquer attitude in which the Reagan 
administration engaged regarding the Middle East. Paraphrasing Donald Rumsfeld, Arvind 
Rajagopal has asserted that “the idea that the US can employ allies when required and turn away 
from them when its mission demands . . . ignores the fact that allies are not any longer just 
distant nations.”80 This underscores two factors that resonate within this thesis. First, that 
globalization demands a new political paradigm and, second, that the dogmas of the quiet past 
are, once again, insufficient to the stormy present. A new paradigm is essential and a new US 
foreign policy is required; one that emphasizes international law in a constructive manner. 
 Five centuries, and as many treaties, had determined the borders between Iran and Iraq, 
the boundaries of which had been overseen by both Russia and Britain with (as early as 1908) oil 
being the basis for claims. “In four different treaties Iraq suffered a significant loss of some of 
the most important of its national territory. On each occasion, the loss resulted from political 
coercion by external Western powers. Given this legacy and the especially humiliating character 
of the 1975 treaty, it is reasonable to understand why Iraq might have gone to war in 1980 when 
it felt that power and opportunity were in its favor.”81 That both Iraq and Iran were used as 
pawns by both of the superpowers is clear. The salient issue for this thesis, however, is that these 
historical precedents fomented an intense distaste for the Western powers which had colluded to 
usurp the sovereignty of the Persian Gulf states, one that was fueled by earlier Western 
escapades in the Middle East and one that would be framed by the containment policy in the 
twentieth century. It was both the economic aspect that petroleum deposits in the Persian Gulf 
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represented as well as the political containment of the Soviet Union that were the historical bases 
of the Iran-Iraq War. The United States only confounded the problem by arming both sides. 
 Gregory Sanjian, in an article entitled Arms and Arguments: Modeling the Effects of 
Weapons Transfers on Subsystem Relationships, asked the question “did they (the US and the 
USSR supplied arms to both Iran and Iraq) contribute to political cooperation and balanced 
military relationships or did they perpetuate conflictual and imbalanced relations?”82 Sanjian 
conducted a study which explored the impact of US, USSR, and certain third-party (chiefly the 
United Kingdom and People’s Republic of China) arms transfers on Iran and Iraq within the 
context of their political and military relationships during the Cold War. The model examined by 
the author’s study consisted of two state transformation equations that described the evolution of 
relations between arms importers. Testing on the models over the period 1950-91 shows the UK 
to have been a balancer of military relations in the Persian Gulf, the US and China, on the other 
hand, emerge as a consistently an imbalanced nuance. The tests also suggested that the USSR 
behaved conservatively, for the most part reacting to US use of arms transfers as a foreign policy 
tool. This study of imbalance further informs this thesis. It underscores how the US used its 
weapons production ability as a tool for foreign policy with implications for its prestige in the 
Middle East. It did so out of a sense of pragmatism. Yet that pragmatic aspect of the use of 
Middle Eastern states as proxies for war; be it political or economic, is no longer viable and has 
only served to further alienate the Islamic people. Sanjian’s research bears this out.  
Arms transfers from the US to Iran began in the late 1940s and increased dramatically 
with the Nixon Administration. The US emerged as a destabilizer of the military relations 
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between Iran and Iraq, Sanjian has determined. The USSR, on the other hand, became a 
stabilizer because its deliveries to Iraq eased the imbalance between the importers.”83 It was this 
duplicitous behavior on the part of the United States that would serve to alienate many in both 
Iraq and Iran with consequences for the future. “Cold War imperatives and each actor's role 
during that epoch probably account for many of the findings presented in [Sanjian’s] research. 
The US appears to have been a very determined exporter, increasing weapons shipments when 
possibly it should not have (e.g., to Iran in the 1970s), and using arms transfers to break its 
opponent's hold on a client-states. The USSR, in contrast, was more conservative, seldom 
providing weaponry to either the past or present friends of the US”84 Obviously the US had an 
obligation to serve its own interests but these destabilizing arms shipments to both Iran and Iraq 
only proved antithetical to the possibility of a working relationship with both and fueled a 
growing resentment in the Middle East for the United States in general. 
I have laid out the historical factors that explain the shift in Soviet strength throughout 
the Cold War. I have done so with an eye toward how the changing role of two superpowers 
affected Mid-East relations. Moreover, I have made clear how this alienated the Arab states that 
were used as pawns by both the US and the USSR and how that fueled Islamic jihad. Within 
these discussions I have also noted some of the causes for the failure of Soviet socialism and the 
rationalities for Truman Doctrine. I now move on to the emergence of the US as a global 
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hegemon and the power vacuum that was created as a function of the success of the containment 
policy. 
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Chapter Three:  
The Fall of Communist Russia and the Rise of Islamic Extremism 	
The years between 1989 and 2001 saw the fall of Communism throughout Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the United States reduced its 
own commitment to containment in the Middle Eastern. And as the foreign policy of realism of 
the Reagan years gave way to the achievement of that goal the Bush (41) administration dealt 
with the rising tide of Islamic identity and fundamentalist notions of Islam throughout the 
Muslim world. In the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the United States and the end of the 
Soviet threat there arose a new form of Islamic identity that relied on iconic forms of Muslim 
symbology and touchstones that incorporated the history of Islam against the crusaders of the 
West. This geopolitical about-face by the two superpowers of the world left these forces to 
incorporate that symbolism with the organizational techniques that they had learned from their 
foreign subsidizers with complicated implications for the future of the Muslim world. Popular 
mobilization and Islamic revivalism took center stage within the Middle East and ignited a series 
of conflicts that pitted the Arab states against Israel, West versus East, and Sunni against Shiite 
in a pivotal decade of influence and dominance along boundaries between states like Iraq and 
Iran, Pakistan and Iran, and Syria and Lebanon to name a few. Into this conflagration the US 
sought to divide the pan-Islamic movement by resupplying various Mid-East states with military 
support and financial aid. The backlash of that policy was the rise of popular Islam in which 
movements such as al Qaeda thrived. This was another of the unintended consequences of the 
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Truman Doctrine and containment. This third chapter seeks to explain the rise of fundamentalist 
Islam’s usurpation of Western technology to spread symbolism specific to the Muslim world. 
Within this new realist environment groups like the Taliban came unto their own with a 
jihadist message that demanded a response to the Western “abuse” of Muslims. Furthermore, 
technology and asymmetric warfare were engaged in by these groups in order to thwart the 
control of the US government - which still did not have a viable replacement for the Truman 
Doctrine of containment until the election of Bill Clinton in 1992 and the embrace of the liberal 
Democratic Peace Theory. Though well intentioned, it was too little too late. Regarding the 
democratic enlargement ideal as the antithesis of containment, Clinton set the course of US 
foreign policy along the lines of an economic platform that maintained that democracies do not 
fight one another and international trade is a form of geopolitical glue. What that foreign policy 
failed to take into account was the fact that democracy cannot be exported the way that other 
commodities are - and the notion that the Muslim world must make their own peace with the idea 
that globalization was upon them. It was not simply a matter of US hegemony that demanded 
that they reconcile that fact with Islam. On this matter the US policy-makers were behind the 
curve. Clinton merely recast containment through the exportation of swords into the exportation 
of plowshares. It was containment by any other name that had only changed to an economic, 
rather than military, form.   
On January of 1990, after the failure of the Soviet systems in Eastern Europe, after the 
Soviet departure from Afghanistan, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union itself by 1991, it 
was very clear that the dogmas of the quiet past were insufficient to the stormy present of the 
modern era. The expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan demanded revised foreign policy in 
order to meet the implications of the future but was met with apathy at best. President Clinton 
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spoke of a peace dividend with no acknowledgement of the looming specter of Islamic 
fundamentalism and little understanding of the implications of the Soviet threat. 
It is no secret that the United States abandoned its former proxy/client states throughout 
the Muslim world after the demise of the Soviet Union; but in discussing the expulsion of the 
Soviets from Afghanistan, Joel Rosenberg noted that after the unflinching resolve of the Afghan 
people to fight the Communists in their own country the US abdicated its well-earned goodwill 
in the region by cutting any ties with that nation afterward. The opportunity to aid the Afghans 
was wasted by a complacent US government whose only agenda to that time was to thwart the 
Soviet. We had an opportunity, Rosenberg argued, to assist the Afghans by allocating funds for 
schools, roads, electrical plants, and fresh water wells, but passed on that opportunity in a short-
sighted foreign policy that was myopic at best. “I’m not saying we should have done everything 
for them,” Rosenberg asserts, “but we could have helped. We should have helped; but we did 
not. Once the Soviets pulled out, we pulled out too.”85 That vacuum created a fertile ground for 
Islamic fundamentalism and fanaticism in a part of the world where it would have been more far-
sighted to continue our presence with policy implications for the next three decades. At the very 
least we should have been engaged in the region. This realization dawned slowly however in the 
US and was met with antipathy by a Republican Congress in Washington.  
The new world order that George H. W. Bush (41) had promised the American electorate 
was long overdue, but met the fate of a single minded focus on Communism and not the long 
term interests of the United States. The documentation regarding the success of the policy of 
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containment, vis-à-vis the Soviets, is clear.86 Yet the long-term interests of the United States 
were not served by the antagonizing Western notions that it inflicted throughout the Middle East 
solely as a matter of US interests. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the United States from the 
Middle East, as a function of the efficacy continuing containment in a new form, created a 
similar vacuum that manifested a new identity of rage against the West in the Arab states. To that 
end, conservative Muslim leaders and clerics (to identify just a few) began to assert themselves 
as representatives for jihad against the Judeo-Christian powers whom they asserted were the next 
enemy of Islam. They did so by carefully crafting their message; usurping Arab and Islamic 
symbols and iconology. And they did so because the government of the United States frittered 
away a perfect opportunity to further engage groups that had every reason to suspect the US after 
abandoning them when they had completed the US goal of containment of the Soviets. 
Containment was, these defenders of the faith announced, merely a continuation of the crusader 
imperatives that had been established a millennium earlier and had underscored the worst fears 
of the Islamic faithful; they could trust no one but themselves and Allah. American withdrawal 
from the Middle East secured that perception and fundamentalist clerics recognized an 
opportunity to paint the US as the latest threat to Islam. 
By using well understood Islamic precepts, these rising leaders of conservative Islam 
attracted followers to their cause and sought to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of both 
the American and Soviet governments who only regarded the Middle East strategically for its oil 
reserves. Moreover, the Middle Eastern states, having learned the organizational techniques of 
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combat and subterfuge from their American and Soviet handlers, combined those skills with the 
usurpation of symbols integral to Islam. They did so in order to capture the loyalties of the 
Muslim people. Moreover, they were able to focus Muslim’s hatred of the West through 
extremist rhetoric geared toward popular Islam as a means for the assertion of authority. Still, the 
US government had no one to blame but itself when it abandoned the Muslim world’s interests 
while never considering abandoning the isolationist/containment policies of the previous century. 
Arms and diplomatic aid were no substitutes for active diplomacy and the vacuum of American 
presence in the Muslim world was realized about the same time as the rout of the Red Army in 
Afghanistan. Muslim interests became more palpable during this period. 
 As the Soviet Union was gearing up to invade Afghanistan in 1979 the Iranian Monarchy 
was overthrown by radical Muslim students in Tehran and several other urban centers throughout 
the country. A decade prior, a little known cleric (outside of the Middle East) named Ruhollah 
Mussavi Khomeini, was poised to take the reins of the Islamic revolution into his own hands. As 
early as 1964 Bijan Jazani, a young Iranian Marxist activist, had declared that “Khomeini would 
most likely play a major role in any future revolutionary movement, and professor Hamid Algar 
wrote in 1969 that “protests in religious terms will continue to be voiced and the appeals of men 
such as Ayatollah Khomeini to be widely heeded.”87 That prescience was too close to the mark 
to be ignored today and only the US lack of ground intelligence at the time could be construed to 
be the cause of our failure to see that the now infamous Ayatollah Khomeini posed just as 
serious a threat to US interests as the USSR had just after the Second World War. “The dominant 																																																								
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view,” according to Milani, “was that Islam had become a peripheral force” in the region.”88 Yet 
what followed was the upending of American foreign policy in an area that only a year before 
President Jimmy Carter had described as an island of stability. In retrospect, Carter was 
misinformed. But whether we ran out (Afghanistan) or were run out (Iran) of the Muslim world 
in the last twenty years of the twentieth century, it was the resulting vacuum of a policy to 
replace containment that set the stage for the rise of Islamic extremism after the demise of the 
Soviet threat. And it was from that vacuum that the greatest source of unintended consequences 
in the Muslim world was precipitated and the biggest failure of American foreign policy was 
realized. Ironically, it is now the US that is engaged in military operations in Afghanistan today 
and not the Russians. The Truman Doctrine has become as conspicuous in its absence as it was 
in its unintended consequence as a force for the rise of anti-Western rhetoric throughout the 
Muslim world. Furthermore, it is now the blood and treasure of the US, not the USSR that are 
being lost. 
 That policy failure was articulated by Jane Perlez, writing for the New York Times, on 
May 17, 1992. “Once avidly wooed by Washington and Moscow with large amounts of 
economic aid and modern armaments, the impoverished nations of Africa,” and the Middle East, 
were left to fend for themselves. Since the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the 
fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, the superpower rivalry had “been replaced by 
international indifference,”89 Perlez further argued. Moreover, though the abandonment of these 
states was most evident in Africa, that scenario was repeated throughout the Middle East and 																																																								
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South West Asia. The strategic importance of those proxy states was diminished by the very 
success of the Truman Doctrine. "With the end of the Cold War,” Muslim dominated regions 
“lost whatever political luster it may have once had," Michael Chege, a Kenyan political scientist 
working in Zimbabwe asserts. There were no compelling geopolitical, strategic, or economic 
reasons other than oil "to catapult it to the top of the global economic agenda.”90 Having seen the 
demise of the Soviet Union the Truman Doctrine was, after 1991, wholly without merit and an 
anachronism. Yet there was no clear direction for the future of US foreign policy even while the 
rise of the Middle East, as a new threat, was becoming clear. This was inconceivable to many 
even as the Soviet Union crumbled. 
In an earlier article, published in the Times on March 30, 1991, Tom Wicker exposed the 
deficiency in the Bush (41) administration’s thinking. After the invasion of Kuwait, by 
neighboring Iraq (led by Saddam Hussein), George H. W. Bush fashioned a modern coalition to 
evict the Iraqis from the oil-rich gulf state. “Certainly the US had a military strategy that proved 
highly successful in evicting Iraq from Kuwait. But a military strategy is no more than an 
instrument of the higher political purposes for which a war supposedly is fought.”91 What was 
needed, and yet was sorely lacking in American foreign policy regarding the Middle East (and 
the greater Muslim world) at this time, was a clear and coherent approach to dealing with the 
rising threat that to US economic interests in the region. The “recent unsettling events in the 
Middle East,” asserted Wicker, “raise the question whether George Bush ever developed a 
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coherent national strategy to guide him in the Persian Gulf War and its aftermath.”92 It would 
appear that in the absence of the strategic policy of containment that no long-term policy plan 
had been put in place regarding the Middle East and this lack of strategic foresight would come 
to haunt the United States in ways that the American people could never have imagined. “Surely 
it must have been clear to the Bush Administration's war planners that if Saddam Hussein and his 
Baath Party Government in Iraq were destroyed by the war, the resulting power vacuum would 
be dangerous,”93 wrote Wicker at the time, and yet the administration had still not conceived of a 
plan to the Islamic fundamentalist challenge.  
The success of the policy of containment enabled two outcomes. First, it armed our client 
states in the region against the Soviet threat with both conventional munitions and operational 
abilities. Second, it also acted as a source of irritation to the masses of those states - in that the 
US did so by propping up a series of authoritarian regimes whose only interest was to stay in 
power at the expense of their own people. Each successive US administration backed figures 
such as the Shah of Iran, the House of Saud, and the Baath party of Saddam Hussein. The US did 
so at the cost of any good will throughout the region. After having armed those despots, we 
turned a blind eye toward their repressive regimes in the name of US national security. The 
security of Israel was an integral part of that strategy but Israel is also fundamental to the 
safekeeping of US interests throughout the Middle East.  
When containment succeeded the US government cut its presence in the region, including 
foreign/diplomatic aid, and left those former proxy states with huge arsenals of American made 
weaponry, operational techniques, and no economic aid to offset the effects of decades of 																																																								
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repression. The Soviets, until the collapse of the USSR, did the same. The two superpowers used 
the Muslim world as a global chessboard and when the game was resolved cut and run, leaving 
the peoples of that part of the world economically destitute. It was in that environment that the 
Muslim people turned to the admonitions of Sunni and Shiite clerics alike against the only 
remaining Great Satan; the USA. 
In the absence of any clear American policy in the Middle East, the Muslim clerics of the 
Middle East and Persian Gulf states were able to rely on fiery rhetoric and the symbolism of 
Islam to incite and foment antipathy toward the West. In 1994, for example, Chris Hedges, 
writing for the New York Times reported that the revolution in Iran was at a crossroads. “The 
mullahs' selective use of the Muslim holy book, the Koran, to justify their domination of this 
nation,” Hedges wrote at the time, “has a corollary. If you replaced the Koran with copies of Das 
Kapital, and substituted a few catch phrases, what is happening might make even Molotov feel at 
home. Iranian critics of the current regime are already calling the process “Islamic 
Communism.”94 A campaign of propaganda had been foisted upon the masses of many Muslim 
states supporting conservative Islamic groups’ efforts to take control of those states in which 
they operated. “The Iranian leadership would flinch at such comparisons,” noted Hedges, “not 
only because it feels that its experience is unique, but because the battle is glossed over with the 
language of social welfare. And its image of itself as a religious regime declares it an enemy of 
both Western capitalism and atheistic Communism.”95 Nevertheless, that propaganda was 
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designed to assert authority in a region that had been vacated by both of the superpowers at the 
end of the Cold War and marked the beginning of the rise of Islam as a force for change. 
The documentation of the miscalculated abandonment of the Afghanis was clarified by 
Rosenberg when he stated unequivocally that “the provisional post-Soviet Afghan government 
collapsed in 1992, and into the vacuum rushed radicals, specifically Mohammed Omar – aka 
Mullah Omar – the ferocious and fanatical mujahedeen commander who one lost an eye in a 
firefight with the Russians but recovered and went on to found the Taliban, one of the most 
extreme jihadist organizations on the planet.”96 Building a purely Islamic country, based on the 
Sharia law, Omar fashioned the Taliban from the ground up on the ashes of the past experiences 
of his dealings with both the Evil Empire of the North, the Soviet Union, and the Great Satan: of 
the United States.”97 The Afghanis had been raped and pillaged,” Rosenberg recalls, “and they 
had now been abandoned and betrayed by the infidels from the West.”98 How that betrayal and 
abdication of superpower responsibility was rewarded is best understood through the lens of 
what Patrick D. Gaffney calls “popular Islam.” 
The term “popular Islam” suggests a variety of meanings across different fields of 
discourse, asserts Gaffney. “Most generally, it occurs as a term of contrast. It describes one set of 
phenomena presumably associated with the populace or the masses against another set joined to 
the elite. On another level, however, as a unit of analysis, popular Islam also serves as a 
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symbolic index for the assertion of authority.”99 It covers a wide swath of cultural aspects of 
society including orthodoxy, authenticity, legitimacy, social justice, modernity, alignment, 
popularity, and accountability. “More recently, popular Islam has arisen as a concept of major 
significance in discussions of the ideological, social, political, and economic tensions that 
currently challenge many regimes and to some extent the entire international order of the 
contemporary Middle East.”100 It is also the method by which extremist groups throughout the 
Middle East and the Muslim world manifested links to Islamic extremism in the name of the pan-
Islamic movement against the West. It is, in a word, identity. Popular Islam is at the root of the 
Arab mind and the neo-Muslim mindset. It is the force behind Islamic extremism and, as such, 
“popular Islam has come to be variously identified with the perceived properties of everything 
signaled by Islamic fundamentalism.”101 It is, in effect, the equivalent of the American populist 
movements which paint with broad strokes general messages that resonate with a large 
percentage of the populace in order to generate a civil backlash against corrupt elites in the name 
of the suffering of the masses. It does so, often, through the use of religious edicts, fatwas 
(religious doctrines), and jihad (struggle) against the oppressors, the infidels, and the apostate. It 
is powerfully symbolic in nature. 
 If the reality of jihad is Islamic interdependence however, it is not clear if the idea of 
national indomitability could be sustained vis-à-vis radical Islamic fundamentalism. It may have 
led to more defensiveness and stridence, more internal repression in the Middle East 
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domestically, and more enemies abroad that are recognized as antithetical to Muslim interests. 
On the other hand, these fatwas and jihad have been an effective propaganda tool for mobilizing 
the masses against a unified enemy; in this case the West in general and the United States 
specifically. Often it appears that the rhetoric of Islamists seek two goals. First, the mobilization 
of the people against the West through the use of imagery iconic to the Muslim world; which 
was the primary goal of the Muslim revivalists, was immediate and primary. Second, the 
revivalists of Islam sought a return to their roots in a world that had moved beyond their ability 
to control. That inability led them to inculcate the Western lessons that they had learned, earned, 
and garnered. The interesting fact however is that Islam is adapting despite what its most 
vociferous guardians claim they are defending; fundamental adherence to Islam. 
The tipping point for the US was the threat to US economic interests in the Middle East. 
For the states in which Islamists thrived, defense of Islam and claims to orthodoxy were 
admissible insofar as they did not put their own state’s legitimacy in question despite US 
interests. There has always been a risk of repression being used as a tool by Islamists who made 
use of this kind of rhetoric in the public sphere. However, the rhetoric of Muslim morality has 
not generally allowed for debate that pointedly question concepts of government and equal 
representation within the orthodoxy of Islam. Moreover, Muslim extremists that have 
championed fringe elements of Islam have incorporated a dogma of winning the hearts and 
minds of the local peoples by supplying food, water, electricity, and basic necessities to the 
people of places like Gaza, the West Bank, Cairo, and Beirut. They have not been interested in 
questions of liberty, individualism, or US interests. Thus, the rhetoric of Islamic fundamentalists 
became a tool for the unified fight against the West, the “other” as it were, rather than a call for 
the overthrow of the existing governments of the Arab and Persian Gulf states. It did so within 
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the template of fulfilling a basic social service. Providing the peoples of these war-torn areas 
with the basic necessities has won the hearts and minds of those people, not the championship of 
their civil liberties.  
If, as the Arab saying goes, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” then extremists have 
proven themselves a friend to Muslims while objectifying the West as the “other” – and thus the 
enemy. It is for this reason that the governments of the Middle East allowed the rhetoric of 
firebrand clerics and mullahs to go unchecked. Terrorism served as a method of iconography and 
unification. Yet the leaders of some states, Saudi Arabia and Yemen in particular, turned a blind 
eye toward activities that they deemed based on misguided Koranic interpretations by groups 
such as the embrace of Wahhabism, al Qaeda, or fundamentalist elements within the Muslim 
world. Extremists feel that they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. These elements have 
traded on the propaganda techniques that the Western powers had taught them to focus against 
the Communist infidels and redirected in order to incite rage against the Western capitalist 
infidels. 
The rhetoric that encouraged these terrorist acts was the real instigator in the post Cold 
War era. During the early 1990s the Taliban, the same freedom fighters that the US had supplied 
and supported during the Reagan years, grew in strength in Afghanistan while the rhetoric of a 
little known group, al Qaeda, became more vitriolic. It was that cabal of Islamic fundamentalism 
that began launching attacks on both civilian and military targets of the West throughout the 
world. The sole intention of this Sunni extremist group was to inculcate the specter of fear in the 
Muslim world against the West through asymmetrical warfare in the name of the prophet 
Mohammed. It can be argued that they were misguided by extremist notions of Islam, as many 
scholars of Islam have asserted - but in the end it was indeed an effective technique for 
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mobilizing the Muslim masses against the “Zionist crusaders” who sought to exterminate the last 
drop of Muslim blood in an attempt to overthrow the righteous place of Allah in the Middle East 
and the holy places of Mecca and Medina and Jerusalem. Not ironically, the state of Israel, 
Islamic fundamentalists have reasoned, is a platform for Western enforcement of their interests. 
Here these two issues meet as one. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the next target for the Islamists was the United 
States, and having tasted the blood of the Red Army in Afghanistan they felt that Allah was on 
their side. They were empowered to do the work of God. No matter that the US had armed and 
trained the Mujahideen against the Soviets. Our blind foray into the holy land during the 1990 
expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and our stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia was all 
that was needed for al Qaeda to take up the call to expel the new infidel army from the holy land 
of Mohammed. As Porter Goss, the Former Bush CIA put it: “they are energized and determined, 
and they know how to exploit asymmetric warfare to their purpose.”102 This came to fruition in 
1993 when the Twin Towers in Manhattan, in New York City, were bombed. 
Muslim cleric Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, had been linked to El-Sayyid Nosair, an 
Egyptian sentenced to seven to twenty-three years for crimes related to the slaying of Rabbi Meir 
Kahane, an Israeli right-wing leader. Mohammed A. Salameh, the suspect arrested in the 
bombing of the World Trade Center, was said by law-enforcement officials at the time to have 
been a follower of the blind Muslim cleric, Rahman, who preached a violent message of Islamic 
fundamentalism from a walk-up mosque in Jersey City. Radical Islam had not been recognized 
as such an imminent threat by then.  
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Whether the sheik had any connection to the World Trade Center bombing was unknown 
in 1993 but there were issues regarding Rahman’s credentials. His name did not come up 
publicly, since he had over-extended his tourist visa. In private, law-enforcement officials said 
only that they knew Mr. Salameh was a follower of the radical cleric and that the link between 
the men was stronger than simply attendance at the mosque. But it was determined that Rahman 
had eluded detection even though he was on the official United States terrorist list and widely 
regarded in Egypt as a spiritual leader of several radical underground Islamic extremist groups 
known collectively as Islamic Jihad. These groups advocated violent revolution against the 
Egyptian government and they had an agenda regarding the United States as well. Rahman 
became a charismatic preacher in mosques in Brooklyn and New Jersey. His followers were 
growing and thought to number in the thousands in the New York area and in Egypt, where his 
speeches were brought back on cassette tapes. The fifty-five year-old cleric appeared as almost a 
helpless figure, blind, with one eye without a pupil, the other an empty socket. Nevertheless, his 
message -- aimed particularly at the young was a violent one, calling for the murder of "infidels" 
and the creation of a pure Islamic state in Egypt. He did so through the technology of cassettes 
and mass media.”103  
Khomeini too had exercised control over his followers through the use of technology. 
Milani noted that fifteen years earlier the cleric employed technology and that “with Khomeini 
gaining free access to the Western media, a war of nerves had had begun between him and the 
Shah – a war in which the Ayatollah proved to be a master tactician.”104 This was yet another 
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instant in which the Islamists used the “weapons” (those being organizational and technical) of 
the West against their avowed foes for the purposes of bringing down those enemies of Islam, as 
they described them. The clerics and mullahs of the Middle East who were now opposed to the 
West used the technology that the West had created against the very enemy that the Western 
powers sought to destroy; Communism. The embrace of technology to serve their purposes has 
in fact accelerated dramatically. “In the past couple of decades, terrorist groups have thrived by 
exploiting information technology, which has lessened their dependence on physical havens. By 
utilizing networks such as the internet, terrorists’ organizations have become more network-like, 
not beholden to any one headquarters.”105 It brought their message of jihad to a level that was far 
easier to disseminate to more people than any fiery sermon from a mosque could ever hope to 
accomplish and gave weight to that message in ways that the United States government refused 
to acknowledge or mitigate. It was, indeed, a master stroke. Milani’s insight into the importance 
of Khomeini’s use of technology is correct. This was a fulcrum of the success of fundamental 
and radical Islam. The nebulous nature of the threat made it difficult to perceive however. 
Until the 1990s the US had been engaged in a war against an identifiable and wholly 
cognizant entity; the Soviet Union. Additionally, as I mentioned earlier in this thesis, there has 
been a tension between the foreign policies of realism and liberalism that have become 
personified by the Republican and Democratic parties in the US. Under Reagan, the dominant 
theme was realism. That foreign policy continued to be the focus of US policy throughout the 
first two years under George H. W. Bush but gradually moved toward a liberal mindset toward 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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the end of Bush’s presidential tenure with his declaration that a “new world order” was arising. 
That somewhat liberal approach came to complete fruition under the administration of Bill 
Clinton. The shift in policy from realism to liberalism would not, however, mitigate the 
formidable force of the use of the technology by Khomeini or others but that shift in policy was 
made formal in 1992. Economic issues were the major focus of the Clinton administration even 
if those issues were founded on neo-containment through economic means. 
During the eight years of the Clinton administration the foreign policy goals of the United 
States were championed under the flag of the Democratic Peace theory. “If the Cold War had 
focused the United States on containing global threats to democracy and open markets, Clinton 
advised his NSC, its end freed him to find ways to expand the community of market 
democracies,” including those in the Muslim world.106 So on August 18 [1993] Anthony Lake 
[Clinton’s National Security Advisor] summoned NSC members Jeremy Rosner, Leon Fuerth, 
and Donald Steinberg to his White House office for the express purpose of devising a strategic 
vision with an accompanying catch phrase. What became known as the "Kennan Sweepstakes" 
was set in motion.”107 
Democratic Enlargement, under the auspices of the Democratic Peace Theory, was what 
the Clinton administration finally settled on as their vision for American foreign policy. This had 
the benefit of encompassing defending US economic interests with defense of the United States 
through constructive democracy abroad. “Clinton likened enlargement to the old anti-Communist 
																																																								
106. Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,,” Foreign 
Policy, no. 106 (Spring, 1997), 110-127. 
 
107 . Martin Walker, Comment: The Clinton Doctrine, The New Yorker, October 7, 
1996. P. 7.  
 
80 
	
“domino theory” in reverse: It posited that where Communist command economies collapsed, 
free markets would eventually arise and flourish - now the age of geopolitics has given way to an 
age of what might be called geo-economics," - journalist Martin Walker wrote in the October 7, 
1996, New Yorker.’”108 The problem was that this vision, while it was less hostile than the realist 
alternative, came with unintended consequences of its own. Democracy has been demonstrated 
not to be a fungible commodity that could be counted on to make a difference in the lives of 
ordinary men and women in the Islamic world where the main concerns were shelter, water, and 
food. Democracy was a concept that was specific to the West and only occurred over hundreds 
of years beginning with the enlightenment and came to fruition in the cauldron of American 
notions of exceptionalism. Yet, as Rosenberg pointed out, the US should have done more in the 
Middle East to link democratic principles to sustainable support for the Muslim people. Having 
abdicated that role, the simple promotion of democracy was not a viable replacement for the 
policy of containment. Despite Muslim sensitivities it was, moreover, framed within the 
containment strategy of a new economic realism. The Democratic Peace Theory should have 
been incorporated in a more holistic manner and incorporated into the foreign policy of the 
United States in concert with other fundamentals of American foreign policy. 
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Chapter Four:  
Arab Spring, or the Culmination of the Historical and  
Political Missteps in the Middle East during the Twentieth Century 
 
 The culmination of the argument presented in this thesis found its beginnings in late 
December of 2010 near the small Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid. Mohammed Bouazizi, a 
university student who also worked as a fruit vendor, was the victim of the rampant political 
corruption that flowed from the country’s leadership down to even the most local municipal 
police forces. Tunisians “watched for 23 years as Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s dictatorship became 
a grating daily insult. From Tunis — the whitewashed, low-rise capital with a tropical, colonial 
feel — to the endless stretches of olive and date trees in the sparsely populated countryside, the 
complaints were uniform: It had gotten so you couldn’t get a job without some connection to Ben 
Ali’s family or party. The secret police kept close tabs on ordinary Tunisians. And the uniformed 
police took to demanding graft with brazen abandon.”109 Bouazizi was forced to bear 
humiliations, one after another, at the hands of a female police officer. Finally, after the theft of 
his fruit and scales the police officer who had stopped Bouazizi, Fedya Hamdi, and two other 
officers beat Bouazizi and then Hamdi slapped him in the face in front the crowd. For Middle 
Eastern men, such treatment at the hands of a woman is a source of grave shame. Shortly 
afterward the boy returned to the market and set himself ablaze in protest. The resulting protests 
resulted in hundreds of deaths. Those events lit the fuse of a much larger conflagration 																																																								
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throughout the entire Middle East, one which would spread like wildfire throughout the Islamic 
world for years to come.   
By mid January, 2011, Ben Ali had fled to Saudi Arabia under pressure. Anti-government 
demonstrations throughout the countryside forced Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi to 
resign and he was replaced by veteran politician Beji Caid Essebsi. Created by the vacuum of 
power left by the flight of Ben Ali and his friends and family and aided by rising social media 
sources such as Facebook the people of Tunisia now had access to some inconvenient truths 
which had never seen the light of day because of the censorship policies of the Ben Ali regime. 
Following the announcement of the results of Tunisia's first free election in October in which the 
rigidly Islamist Ennahda party won most of the seats in the constituent assembly events in 
Tunisia only became more politically entangled with Islamic extremism. Into the vacuum flowed 
the most passionate agendas by those most willing to sacrifice civility for theological beliefs 
founded on hardline Islamic principles. Unrest was triggered over art exhibits deemed offensive 
to Islam. Clashes at the US Embassy in Tunis resulted in the deaths of four attackers because of a 
film deemed anti-Islamic. Hundreds more were wounded or killed in clashes between police and 
protesters in Siliana, near Tunis in late November and early December at the end of 2012. By 
this time, the protests in the Maghreb had extended beyond the borders of Tunisia. Two years 
earlier, days after Ben Ali had fled the country and gone to Saudi Arabia, Egypt’s Day of Revolt 
brought together thousands of protesters after the internet campaign inspired by the uprising in 
Tunisia animated similar unrest in Cairo.110  
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Social media sites such as YouTube and Twitter had been blocked by government run 
agencies in both Tunisia and Egypt in order to inhibit the coordination of protests in the two 
African states. The relatively recent rise of Facebook took officials by surprise. Attempts to 
control the dissemination of information and coordination of anti-government gatherings had 
been the bedrock policy of dictatorships in the region for decades. However the quickly changing 
landscape of the social media world presented serious challenges authoritarian governments 
determined to stifle dissent. “The events in Cairo were coordinated on a Facebook page - tens of 
thousands of supporters clicked on the page to say they would take part . . . thousands joined the 
protests after an internet campaign inspired by the uprising in Tunisia.”111 On January 25, 2011, 
demonstrators remained in the city center around Tahrir Square late into the night, vowing to 
camp out overnight and appeals on Facebook for food and blankets were made to support the 
protestors’ efforts. Egyptians had seen and heard about the toppling of Tunisian President Zine 
al-Abidine Ben Ali and now they wanted to wrest control of their own government from 
President Hosni Mubarak who had been in power since 1981 and was responsible for many of 
the same social and political problems that brought about the unrest in Tunisia - rising food 
prices, high unemployment and anger at official corruption.112 Frustrations in the Arab world 
over these social challenges and their recognition fueled by new social media platforms spilled 
into the streets of Cairo. After eighteen days of protests and demonstrations, Hosni Mubarak was 
forced to resign in February 2011, three decades after having taken power. Once again, into the 
political void created by Mubarak’s arrest a group of Islamic fundamentalists rushed in to fill the 
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vacuum. Egypt is not the Islamic monolith that many believe. “Parliamentary elections in 2011-
12 saw the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi elected president. He dissolved the 
House of Representatives and changed the military's leadership. Public opposition to Morsi 
began to build in November 2012, when he issued a decree granting himself far-reaching powers, 
and were fuelled [sic] by the passage of what many considered an Islamist-leaning draft 
constitution.”113 In June of 2013, after millions of protesters once again took to the streets, Morsi 
was deposed. A state security sponsored crackdown on the Islamic brotherhood resulted in the 
deaths of nearly a thousand Morsi supporters and the charter that had been approved under his 
leadership was thrown out and replaced with a new constitution in 2013. The Arab Spring now 
took on a self-sustaining wave of clashes throughout the Maghreb, the Levant, and even the 
Arabian Peninsula. What was unique about the protests in Egypt was the fact that it had been a 
proxy state of both the British and the Americans for nearly a century.  
Just two days after the Egypt’s Day of Revolt tens of thousands of protesters and 
opposition figures took to the streets of the capital of Yemen, Sanaa and called for the removal of 
their president, long-term President Ali Abdullah Saleh, as well. What began in the little-noted 
West-African nation of Tunisia was now beginning to spread to regions that relied heavily on 
western and US support. Groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS in the Maghreb seized opportunities 
provided by the war in Iraq, the unrest in the Maghreb, and the frustrations of the people on the 
street, to create chaos and unrest in order to gain control of huge swaths of the region. David 
Ignatius wrote in the October, 2015 issue of The Atlantic, that what was “ravaging the Middle 
East right now is obviously deeper than ISIS. It has become commonplace over the last year to 
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observe that we are witnessing the collapse of the post-Ottoman order—that the “lines in the 
sand” conjured in 1916 by the British and French diplomats Mark Sykes and François Georges-
Picot are being blown to dust.”114 Ignatius acknowledged the need to form stable counter forces 
to those who would seek to exploit the political voids left when outside powers decided to 
abandon regimes formerly supported by the West. “Attempts by the United States or Islamist 
rebels to topple authoritarian regimes—in Iraq, Libya, and now Syria—create power 
vacuums.”115 Propping up and then later toppling dictators throughout the Middle East has been 
the hallmark of the West since the World War I. Either in an effort to control the natural 
resources of the region or as proxy states to inhibit control there by other nations, the US and the 
West have sown the seeds of their own failure. The post WW II policy of containment of 
Communism was simply the extension of the pre and post WW I protocols of The Great Game 
that Britain had employed to stifle the interests of both the French and the Russians. The fall of 
the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 made those interests moot except for the defense of the 
petroleum industry necessary to fuel the economies and markets of the West. In neither Egypt 
nor Yemen were large petroleum reserves a serious factor. However, once the ball had started 
rolling the Arab Spring took on more serious dimensions as Islamic fundamentalist groups 
realized that controlling oil-producing regions of the Middle East would both hurt US interests 
while also providing a source of income to support Islamic jihad against the West. The unrest 
was stoked and the protests spread. The Arab Spring exploded into life. 
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The Moroccan people took to the streets to demand a change of government and 
constitutional reforms of their own on February 20, 2011. That same day anti-Gaddafi fighters 
seize control of Libya's second largest city. The fighting resulted in several hundred deaths. 
Cities further east, including al-Baida and Tobruk, were already under rebel control. Days earlier 
on February 17, dozens were killed as demonstrations erupted in cities across the country in 
Libya’s Day of Rage. Fighting in Benghazi resulted in hundreds of deaths. Back in Tunisia, on 
the 27th, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi was forced to resign after violent protests over 
his ties to former President Ben Ali. On March 14, at the request of the Bahraini government, 
about 4,000 Saudi Arabian troops were dispatched, to be followed by 500 UAE police. Then, on 
March 15, 2011, anti-government protesters demonstrated in Damascus, the Syrian capital, in a 
rare show of dissent against the country's hardline regime. The pace of unrest and protest began 
to pick up speed. Pro-democracy movements in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria were 
being viewed as an unstoppable force for democratic change throughout the entire Middle East, 
but in each of these instances the unrest by civilian populations was being met with fierce 
resistance by supporters of the regimes being protested. Then, on March 19, 2011 French jets 
began bombing Libya just hours after United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 was 
passed. The US, the UK and other countries joined in the bombings shortly afterward.116 The 
Arab Spring was, by the summer of 2011, becoming a full-blown pan-Islamic revolution in 
nearly all of northern Africa, and many parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Yemeni President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh was the victim of an assassination attempt, rebels battled for control of Tripoli in 
Libya, and the year culminated in a series of clashes, battles, elections, and transfers of power 																																																								
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that hadn’t been witnessed in the Middle East since 622 A.D., when the followers of the Prophet 
Muhammad spread the message of Islam at the point of a sword.  
 Small peaceful protests started in Syria on in January of 2011 and escalated to an 
ongoing internal conflict. The wave of Arab uprisings that began with the Tunisian revolution of 
January 2011 reached Syria in mid-March, when residents of the small southern town of Dara’a 
took to the streets to protest the torture of students who had put up anti-government graffiti. 
Protesters demanded reforms, the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad, allowing political parties, 
equal rights for Kurds, and broad political freedoms, such as freedom of the press, speech, and 
assembly. Such demands were unheard of in Syria. “For decades, the security state established 
by Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, encouraged certain social and economic inequalities as a 
means of divide and rule. Hafez won the support of Syria’s working class and peasantry, largely 
from Syria’s Sunni Arabs who make up 60 percent of the population, by building a large socialist 
state that provided employment and subsidies. He won the backing of Syria’s non Sunni Arab 
minorities – the Christians (10 percent of the population), Druze (3 percent), and his own Alawi 
sect (10 percent). These groups welcomed Hafez’s secular Arab nationalist identity discourse as 
a means to integration, an identity that he promoted through expanded state institutions, notably 
the army and the ruling Ba’ath party.”117 Like Egypt, Syria is not a homogeneous society. It’s an 
amalgam of different groups who have for decades been played against one another for the 
purpose of fostering divisions and maintaining control over the Syrian people. Additionally, 
economic liberalization policies instituted by al-Assad were uneven in their distribution, 																																																								
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reflecting similar divisions to those that had instigated unrest and protests in the Morocco, 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen. “The potential for sectarian conflict has been another tool 
used by the regime to cling onto power. For decades the regime promoted itself as a bastion of 
stability for Syria’s heterogeneous population compared to the sectarian chaos in neighboring 
Iraq and Lebanon.”118 What is being played out in the Islamic world today is exactly the scenario 
that this thesis proposes is a function of the unintended consequences of short-sighted despotic 
leaders from former proxy states of the US and the USSR. Syria, a former Soviet proxy state has 
undergone the same challenges that US client state Egypt underwent only a short time earlier. 
When the overwhelming force of millions of Muslims challenges the government apparatus and 
throws down their leadership the void created provides an opportunity for more fundamentalist 
forces to rush into. The basic framework of my argument is being witnessed throughout the 
Islamic world and provides a compelling defense of my main argument. Of course, all of these 
events were presaged by the events in Iraq following the World Trade Center attacks on 
September 11, 2001.  
When the Bush (43) administration invaded Iraq in 2003 an al-Qaeda recruit named Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, certain that the Americans would do so, aligned himself with what remained 
of Saddam Hussein’s intelligence network, and carried out a series of bombings that shook the 
former US client state to its knees. Specific targets were chosen to pit Sunni against Shia, 
Christian, and Kurd, fracturing the nation in a way that assured a generation of improvised 
devices, sectarian killings, and unfettered bombings. Past administrations have not engaged in a 
viable political vehicle that can accept global parity in a global world of equity and social 
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reform. It remains to be seen whether the current Obama Administration can prime the pump of 
international cooperation. 
What has framed this debate over the last sixty years is the shift between realist defensive 
and liberal economic ideologies. The emerging global economy demands a more constructive 
approach. The realism of the Truman Doctrine of containment has been supplanted by an 
economic containment of non-liberal polities in the Middle East in response to Islamic 
extremism. The realist foreign policy of the United States has been usurped by economic 
initiatives that were predicated on the realist debates of the Cold War and modified to serve a 
global marketplace. On their own, each of these ideologies is woefully unequal to the task of 
global harmony.  
What I have labeled unintended consequences in earlier sections of this thesis some 
economists call “cumulative causation.”119 This cross-disciplinary reference is a familiar analog 
but, more importantly, also implies a causal relationship between the shifting ideologies of 
realism and liberal and fundamentalist extremism of any kind. Additionally, these two disciplines 
of international relations represent a cultural aspect of the social spectrum that is idealized by 
both capitalists and Muslims. National defense and economics serve only to reinforce our 
understanding of political science in the modern world when they are tempered by a cultural 
acknowledgment. Though numerous articles have articulated the relationship between these 
schools of thought, the fact is that the growing interconnectedness of a world (within the rubric 
of global computer viruses, avian flu epidemics and an alarming increase in AIDS, malaria, 																																																								
119. Cumulative causation refers to a self-reinforcing process during which an impulse to 
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swine and avian flu and cholera throughout the world), has rendered containment as obsolete as 
isolationism was in the pre Cold War world. We should engage the tenuous nature of our global 
community and appreciate what new foreign policy will rule that debate. The East-West divide 
that underscored the Cold War has become the template for a new economic divide that is clearly 
more threatening than a constructivist approach that is more encompassing in nature. The 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has referred to the modern world as a global village for good 
reason. 
Our global village is at an impasse and yet our interconnectedness is a fact. The realist 
dogmas of the past cannot serve well the present liberal economics of a global world. The United 
States, most of Europe, and the West seek to operate in a global economic climate that is 
inclusive of the Middle East. This is a defining moment of change for Middle Eastern foreign 
policy and US foreign policy writ large. This moment may well define our realistic expectations 
for the next hundred years. It is imperative that our understanding reflect that possibility and 
assimilate that expectation in a culturally sensitive manner. Realist thought, joined to liberal 
economic understanding, with an eye toward globalization must be tempered by cultural 
understanding and a willingness to seek understanding between competing ideologies. 
That globalization has become reality within the last twenty years is an indication of the 
power of the shift toward global cooperation as well. Moreover, that shift is a manifest function 
of the impact of globalization on a real-time basis. We are being drawn closer to one another 
every day by computer applications, twenty-four hour news cycles, and global currencies such as 
the Euro and the dollar. Economic forces have drawn the world ever closer on a number of levels 
and this fact represents the biggest reason for the necessity of an ideological re-examination of 
the importance of our far-flung economic foreign policy initiatives. Those forces exacerbate the 
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need for a new understanding between the Western and Muslim worlds. Mitigation of extremist 
threats must accompany the real-time electronic nature of our global communications systems 
along with the economic interconnectedness of the East and West. The world is no longer as 
clearly polarized as it was once was. The Truman Doctrine is, finally, obsolete. The new foreign 
policy of the US must be inclusive of both the economic realities as well as the ideological and 
cultural differences between states. The time has arrived for implementation of a long overdue 
embrace of our mutual humanity in ways that foster cooperation – not enmity. Indeed, The 
Democratic Peace theory embraces trade and mutually advantageous economic policy as a buffer 
against military confrontation between states. Marxism, Socialism, and capitalism have not 
proven to be complete failures but they have demonstrated significant flaws. This thesis demands 
that a cross-disciplinary consideration be given to Middle Eastern/Asian and African economic 
disparities in order to meet the challenges of political strife stoked by globalization. We can no 
longer assume that one system is the correct template for the world. Indeed, Geoffrey Hodgsons 
challenges this view – “not by arguing here for the feasibility or superiority of a socialist 
[ideology] or any other alternative to capitalism. It is asserted that the pronouncements on the 
“end of history” ignore the tremendous variety of forms of capitalism itself. In addition, a 
theoretical blindness to the immense variety within the modern system [which] is curiously 
engendered by influential economic theorists from both the Right [sic] and the Left [sic]”120 is a 
fait accompli. “In particular however, although both Karl Marx and Friedrich Hayek have 
contributed an enormous amount to our understanding of how capitalist systems function, they 
both sustain a view of a singular and purified capitalism. They both also ignore the fact that 
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variable systemic impurities are essential to the functioning and development of the system. 
Overall, there is a gaping hole in even the most inspired theoretical analyses of capitalist 
systems.”121 We cannot rely on those quiet dogmas of the past to secure the vision of our mutual 
futures. Cultural divisions throughout the world must inspire our future decisions on foreign 
policy because they are real and, therefore, must be addressed. More importantly, recognition of 
the legitimate grievances of Muslims is a priority. 
This is the real challenge for the future of the West within the Middle East and for the 
United States. Cultural sensitivity and reasonable economic realism represent the basis of the 
future global network as a guiding force for stability. It has the opportunity to suspend the 
Hobbesian notion of all against all in favor of a perfect union of a more global nature. That nexus 
is predicated, observed Hodgson's on the assimilation of societies of specialized economics into 
their own cultures. It cannot be predicated for one group on the less seriously viable economic 
culture of another from outside of the identity of Middle Eastern into the mainstream of states 
within an Arab culture of faith-based sensitivities. In other words, neither the United States, nor 
indeed the Western world, can dictate the nature of the liberal democratic ideal that the Middle 
East can or will embrace. We cannot export our democracy but, rather, must allow the Middle 
East to import its own variety such as the Chinese and Russians have done in the past. Will those 
imported seeds bear fruit? Only time will tell but they will, over the long run, be more stable and 
sustainable affectations of Western liberalism that anything that the US or the West could impose 
on the Arab world. That, more likely than not will be an economic and cultural compromise that 
will, in the end, bear more fruit than a doctrine of containment and imposition that the 
																																																								
121 http://www.booksandideas.net/Conceptualizing-
Capitalism.html#.VUsF2_HIVPw.twitter 
93 
	
containment of Communism policy ever entailed or achieved. What was once inevitable in now 
rendered obsolete. That is the lesson of the Truman Doctrine. There is reliable evidence that 
culture is the defining issue of the future of a more globally engaged US foreign policy initiative. 
The conclusion of this thesis is antithetical to twentieth century predicates but, rather, 
synthesizes a more constructive debate in the twenty-first century model that is proposed by a 
diplomatic peace initiative. The Truman Doctrine of Containment of Communism was 
insufficient to our stormy present. Indeed, these words were intoned by current US President 
Barack H. Obama who recalled our sixteenth president at his final State of the Union Address on 
January 13, 2016, when he stated that at our best, our nation did not, “in the words of Lincoln, 
adhere to the ‘dogmas of the quiet past.’ Instead we thought anew, and acted anew. We made 
change work for us, always extending America’s promise outward, to the next frontier, to more 
people. And because we did -- because we saw opportunity where others saw only peril -- we 
emerged stronger and better than before.”122 These are complex issues that are nuanced and 
remind us of what Karen Elliott House, cited at the beginning of this presentation that a dialog 
was, rather than relying on confrontation, possible on both sides “if for no other reason than to 
clarify opposing positions that are essentially irreconcilable.”123 In the Iranian diplomatic 
initiative that the current administration recently negotiated we envisage that very bargain, 
“Grand” though it has been proposed, and that remains to be seen, it is a dialogue that inspires a 
																																																								
122. Barack Obama “Remarks of President Barack Obama – State of the Union Address 
As Delivered” January 13, 2016, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-–-
prepared-delivery-state-union-address 
 
123 These quotations are taken from the press release of the report, Freedom in the World 
2001 - 2002: The Democracy Gap 
 
94 
	
level of nuance that is moving the United States of America toward a diplomatic solution with 
the Republic of Iran that has been irreconcilable for nearly forty years, The Obama 
administration has been the champion of a carrot-based dialogue that embraces the Democratic 
Peace Theory and a more constructivist approach that validates the repudiation of the realpolitik 
stick that the United States has cobbled together to coerced the Middle East into for the last 
century.  
This synopsis of the Arab Spring has been covered more succinctly by Martin Griffiths, 
Terry O’Callaghan, and Steven Roach in the third edition of International Relations: The Key 
Concepts.124 The international system is anarchical, and “International relations are best 
understood by focusing in the distribution of power among states. Despite their formal equality, 
the uneven distribution of power means that the arena of International relations is a form of 
“power politics.”125 In a global world more interconnected than in any time in history however 
that template is no longer a viable foundation for state interaction. Five factors which Griffiths, 
O’Callaghan and Roach document, “Western intervention, a shared discontent with the 
corruption of Arab rulers, the struggle for a common Arab identity, political instability, /civil 
strife, and the role of the social media”126 have all been documented in this thesis. Throughout 
the twentieth century the Western powers have politically dominated the Middle East. They have 
done so by propping up a series of bad actors whose greed and defiance of their constituent’s 
basic civil rights have created an atmosphere of hate toward both leaders and their foreign 																																																								
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backers. The sub context of a cultural and religious identification has been seized upon by 
theological ideologues who are pitted against an emerging multicultural groundswell demanding 
more secular governance based on the respect of individuality. This notion has been fueled in 
large part through the social media. Shared culture, albeit often a matter of individual choice, is 
arising as a new metric for how the twenty-first century will move forward. A final instance—
that of the American/Iranian “Grand Bargain” regarding the loosening of international sanctions 
against Iran for guarantees of nuclear non-proliferation—is a case in point.  
The deal struck between the Iranian Republic and the US is important because “American 
laws serve as the foundation for many of the US and international sanctions limiting Iran’s 
economic activities.”127 Pushed through Congress by the Obama administration, the deal releases 
seized Iranian assets in exchange for international inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities; and 
though decried by hawks in Congress, this deal strikes to the heart of my thesis. In this case, the 
diplomacy and respect of cultural differences as well as similarities has resulted in a constructive 
rapprochement that has put aside nearly forty years of diplomatic stagnation between these two 
states. Yet that is not to say that there is not a great deal of sympathy for Western notions of 
individualism and culture in the Muslim world.  
The spontaneous outbursts that have been the tell-tale hallmarks of the Arab Spring have 
been fueled by a respect for the rule of law and the notion of democracy in general. Rather than 
cultural monoliths in the Middle East, there is a plain multi-cultural and theological tapestry that 
reflects the “melting-pot” concept of American Exceptionalism, even if imprecisely. The 
common Iranian respects these American values. Zainab Salbi, writing for the New York Times 																																																								
127. Larry Hanauer, “The days after a deal with Iran: Congress’s role in implementing a 
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notes that “It is true that some people in the Middle East harbor feelings of disdain and mistrust 
of the Western world, but such sentiments are not straightforward feelings of hatred. Rather, they 
reflect a dynamic of love-hate, or love-resentment-anger. The true complexity of these feelings 
emerges in whispers during dinner-table conversations, through nuanced gestures or comments 
that people utter only in their native tongues and almost never in English or to Westerners. These 
comments reflect the “unspoken” feeling that is close to the nerve and too sensitive to 
acknowledge to the outside world.”128 Muslims witness the same inconsistent values, financial 
corruption, and both moral “corruption” and racial bigotry that fuels many of the challenges in 
their own states. There is room for agreement and compromise between the two factions who 
share the same God of Abraham as the Jews. We must simply come together in a mutually-
shared atmosphere of respect that values global trade, basic human rights, economic equity, 
religious tolerance, and diplomatic respect based on dialogue and communication. In a globally 
connected world that should prove easy. Realism has not been an altogether successful foreign 
policy in the emerging global world of connectedness and has undermined the standing of the 
United States throughout the Middle East. 
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